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INTRODUCTION
Cramdown1 is messy. It pits a chapter 11 debtor’s stakeholders against each
other, in a match in which the main issue is the value of what each is to receive
under a plan of reorganization. Because cramdown is nonconsensual, any
judicial decision involving cramdown must reconcile deeply-held and diverse
views as to the value being offered.
Valuation in bankruptcy, in turn, is also messy. Courts are often placed in
the position of assigning a monetary value to an asset for which there is either
no seller or no buyer, and often no market. To complicate matters, these assets
are often nothing more than intangible promises of a reorganized debtor;
1 By “cramdown,” I mean the nonconsensual confirmation of a chapter 11 plan of reorganization
achieved under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). I thus use it as a noun. In contrast, I use the two words “cram down” as a
verb to describe the action or process of implementing a cramdown. As I have noted before, albeit in a
different context:

Courts use “cramdown” and “cram down” and “cram-down” interchangeably. Indeed, Justice
Douglas once combined different forms in the same paragraph. Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins.
Corps., 419 U.S. 102, 167 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The hyphenated version appears to
have been the first locution used by a court. New Eng. Coal & Coke Co. v. Rutland R.R. Co., 143
F.2d 179, 189 n.36 (2d Cir. 1944).
The earliest print references to the term use either the two-word or the hyphenated form. Compare
Robert T. Swaine, Present Status of Railroad Reorganizations Legislation Affecting Them, AM.
BAR ASS’N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION ON COMM. LAW 15, 15 (1940) (two-word form) and
Warner Fuller, The Background and Techniques of Equity and Bankruptcy Railroad
Reorganizations—A Survey, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 377, 389, 390 (1940) (hyphenated form).
In re Shat, 424 B.R. 854, 858 n.7 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010) (Markell, J.).
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promises from an entity that has already broken most of its past promises to its
creditors.
Outside of bankruptcy, such promises are routinely valued in the world of
finance. In many cases, markets exist in which such promises are traded. Bond
markets, for example, exist to trade the promises of bond issuers to pay sums
borrowed. Value in these markets is the prices traders are willing to acquire or
release these promises.
In bankruptcy reorganization, plan proponents often craft plans of
reorganization that compel creditors to trade a promise made before
bankruptcy for a promise forged under the plan. The terms may be quite
different. Short-term construction loans can transform into medium- and longterm investments; obligations may become collateralized (and vice versa); and
debt instruments may morph into equity interests.
In many cases, these transformations are consensual. Section 1129(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) provides the plan proponent2 with the ability to
confirm a plan by persuading classes of stakeholders to vote to adopt the plan.
The plan proponent need not convince every creditor or stakeholder;
§ 1129(a)(8) requires only unanimity of class acceptance, not unanimity of
creditor acceptance.3 As a result, if a plan proponent can obtain the positive
votes of more than one-half of those creditors voting in a class, and those
creditors hold at least two-thirds of the debt voting in that class, the class
accepts.4 Outvoted creditors in any class, so long as they will receive at least as
much in reorganization as they would have in a liquidation,5 must accept the
plan’s treatment, as plan confirmation will discharge their claims in excess of
what they receive under the confirmed plan.6
This voting process, however, is not cramdown as it is classically
understood. Cramdown in the historic sense consists of confirmation over the
dissent of an entire class.7 To engage in over-generalization, the Code permits
such confirmation only if the dissenting class receives payment in full (but not

2 I use the term “plan proponent” instead of debtor or debtor in possession, as any party in interest can,
after the expiration of the exclusivity period, propose a plan of reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (2012).
3 Id. § 1129(a)(8).
4 Id. § 1126(c).
5 This requirement flows from § 1129(a)(7), the so-called “best interest of creditors” test.
6 11 U.S.C. § 1141.
7 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.03 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
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more than in full), or if no class junior in priority receives anything.8 The deck
is stacked in favor of plan proponents, however, because “payment in full”
does not have to be payment in cash. It can consist of any sort of “property,”
including the types of intangible promises that banks, investors, and markets
value on a daily basis.9
Whether this daily experience can precisely be transferred to cramdown has
vexed many. This Article looks not at the policies behind cramdown—that is
for another time and place. Instead, this Article looks at the history and
legislative policies behind the current state of cramdown, as well as recent
attempts to value the promises of a reorganizing debtor. Along the way, it
examines Till v. SCS Corp.,10 a 2004 Supreme Court case of major contention
in this area, and Till’s recent application in the cramdown confirmation in
Momentive Performance Materials Inc. (“Momentive”),11 a large, publiccompany chapter 11 case.12
This examination reveals a gap between (1) the purposes and policies of
cramdown as historically understood, and the current contentions; and (2)
expectations of hedge funds and other financial players that cramdown rates
should be determined by the market—the rates an actual lender would accept
in extending credit to the reorganized debtor. Given the history and precedents
in the cramdown area, this Article takes the position that Momentive was
correct, and that courts should resist using such market-based discount rates in
cramdown calculations.
I. THE CONCEPT AND EXCHANGE ANTICIPATED BY § 1129(B)(1)
Section 1129 of the Code governs confirmation of chapter 11 plans of
reorganization. Section 1129(a) sets forth sixteen requirements for
8

See id. ¶ 1129.03[4][a][ii].
See id. ¶ 1129.03[4][a][i][A],[C].
10 541 U.S. 465 (2004).
11 Momentive was an affiliate of the lead debtor, MPM Silicones, LLC. As a consequence, the case is
reported under the name of the affiliate. See In re MPM Silicones, LLC (Momentive), No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014
WL 4436335 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014), aff’d, 531 B.R. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 151771 (2d Cir. filed June 1, 2015).
12 Momentive was not the first case to adopt Till in chapter 11, but it well may be the most notorious,
given the billions of dollars at issue. See In re Pamplico Highway Dev., LLC, 468 B.R. 783, 795 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 2012) (collecting cases); In re SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC, 460 B.R. 38, 55 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2011) (collecting cases); see also Gary W. Marsh & Matthew M. Weiss, Chapter 11 Interest Rates After Till,
84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 209, 221 (2010) (“Till’s formula approach, which adds the prime rate to a debtor–specific
risk adjustment, should now be considered the default interest rate for a Chapter 11 cramdown.”).
9
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confirmation,13 including the consent of each class of creditors or interest
holders under the plan. Confirmation of a plan without the consent of all
classes is possible, but heavily circumscribed. Section 1129(b)(1) sets forth the
requirements. While paragraph (1) relaxes the requirement of unanimous class
consent, all other requirements of § 1129(a) remain in place.14 Thus, to cram
down a nonconsensual plan, the plan proponent must, among other things, still
propose the plan in good faith;15 still pay each impaired creditor at least as
much as it would receive in a liquidation;16 still pay all administrative claims in
full;17 and still establish that the plan is economically feasible.18
In addition, § 1129(b)(1) requires the plan proponent to show that the plan
does not discriminate unfairly against the dissenting class, and is fair and
equitable as to that class.19 Unfair discrimination is a horizontal equity test; it
ensures that a plan does not unduly favor a class having similar priority to the
dissenting class simply because the favored class voted for the plan, and the
dissenting class did not.20 Although valuation issues can and do arise in the
unfair discrimination analysis, those issues are for another time.
This Article focuses on the vertical equity test of § 1129(b)(1): whether a
plan is “fair and equitable” as to the dissenting class. That is, it examines how
the concept of “fair and equitable” polices the distribution of reorganization
value among stakeholders with different nonbankruptcy priorities.
A. The History of “Fair and Equitable”
Undoubtedly, “fair and equitable” is not a crisp, well-defined standard. An
examination of its provenance demonstrates, however, that this vagueness was
intentional from the beginning. While the statutory origins of the phrase lie in
13 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1)–(16) (2012). In individual chapter 11 cases, there is a seventeenth, uncodified
requirement regarding the provision of current tax returns. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 7,
¶ 1129.02[17].
14 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1).
15 Id. § 1129(a)(3).
16 Id. § 1129(a)(7).
17 Id. § 1129(a)(9).
18 Id. § 1129(a)(11).
19 Id. § 1129(b)(1).
20 I have explored this relationship elsewhere, see Bruce A. Markell, A New Perspective on Unfair
Discrimination in Chapter 11, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227 (1998). This article was the subject of an interchange
between the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and myself. See Steven M. Abramowitz et al.,
Making the Test for Unfair Discrimination More “Fair”: A Proposal, 58 BUS. LAW. 83 (2002); Bruce A.
Markell, Slouching Toward Fairness: A Reply to the ABCNY’s Proposal on Unfair Discrimination, 58 BUS.
LAW. 109 (2002).

MARKELL GALLEYSPROOFS2

96

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

12/15/2016 3:05 PM

[Vol. 33

the 1933 and 1934 additions of §§ 7721 and 77B22 to the Bankruptcy Act of
1898,23 the genesis of the phrase lies in early equity receiverships.
1. The Statutory Origins: §§ 77 and 77B
Sections 77 and 77B each required judicial findings as to the fairness of
any reorganization. Section 77, as originally enacted in 1933, did not, however,
use the words “fair and equitable.”24 Rather, it simply stated that the plan had
to be “equitable.”25 It was not until 1935, after the adoption of § 77B, that the
words “fair and” were inserted before “equitable” in both sections.26
The first indication that statutory reorganization law would mirror prior
receivership practice came early. In 1936 the Supreme Court decided In re 620
Church Street Building Corp.27 In that case, the Court held that a
reorganization plan, which dealt with multiple secured creditors secured by the
same collateral, could eliminate the junior secured creditors’ property interests
if the common collateral’s value was insufficient to pay the senior creditor’s
debt in full.28 As the Court stated, allocation of all the collateral’s value to a
senior lienholder extinguished “whatever interest petitioners may have [had] as
junior lienors under the Illinois law” if the senior lien holder’s debt was not
fully discharged.29
Other questions over the meaning of “fair and equitable” quickly made
their way to the Court. In 1939, in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.,
the Court construed § 77B’s use of “fair and equitable.”30 The Court held that
“[t]he words ‘fair and equitable’ . . . are words of art which prior to the advent
of s 77B had acquired a fixed meaning through judicial interpretations in the
field of equity receivership reorganizations.”31

21 Section 77 provided for relief for railroad corporations. Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 204, § 77, 47 Stat.
1467, 1474–82 (1933).
22 Section 77B, enacted a year after § 77, extended the reorganization provisions of § 77 to other types of
corporations. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911, 914 (1934).
23 Pub. L. No. 55-171, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
24 See § 77(g), 47 Stat. at 1479.
25 Id.
26 Act of Aug. 27, 1935, ch. 774, § 77(e)(1), 49 Stat. 911, 918 (1935).
27 299 U.S. 24 (1936).
28 Id. at 27.
29 Id.
30 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
31 Id. at 115.
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2. Incorporation of Prior Equity Receivership Practice
What was Justice Douglas’s “fixed meaning”? Adhering “to the familiar
rule that where words are employed in an act which had at the time a well
known meaning in the law,”32 he explained it as follows:
If the value of the [debtor] justified the issuance of stock in exchange
for old shares, the creditors were entitled to the benefit of that value,
whether it was present or prospective, for dividends or only for
purposes of control. In either event it was a right of property out of
which the creditors were entitled to be paid before the stockholders
could retain it for any purpose whatever.33

In short, secured creditors were to be paid from their collateral before
unsecured creditors share in collateral proceeds, and all creditors, secured or
unsecured, were to be paid in full before any equity holder receives anything.
The Supreme Court, in a series of cases in the early 1940s,34 quickly
confirmed that Case’s interpretation of “fair and equitable” governed § 77
railroad reorganization cases35 and chapter X36 reorganizations.
These cases dealt primarily with the vertical adjustment of rights between
creditors and equity owners. Questions soon arose about the proper treatment
when the debtor was insolvent, and the issue was division of value among
creditor groups with different priorities. Did absolute priority apply among
creditor classes? The Court answered yes.
3. “Fair Equivalents” of Value Under the Statute
After In re 620 Church Street and Case, the Court continued to confirm the
primacy of nonbankruptcy priorities, but also acknowledged the practicalities
of reorganization. In Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee,
St. Paul & Pacific Railroad, the Court reviewed a plan’s allocation of value

32

Id.
Id. at 116 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 508 (1912)); see also Kan. City Terminal
Ry. v. Cent. Union Tr. Co., 271 U.S. 445, 455 (1926) (“Unsecured creditors of insolvent corporations are
entitled to the benefit of the values which remain after lienholders are satisfied, whether this is present or
prospective, for dividends or only for purposes of control.”).
34 See Grp. Of Inst. Inv’rs v. Chi., Milwaukee, Saint Paul & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943); Marine
Harbor Props., Inc. v. Mfr.’s Tr. Co., 317 U.S. 78 (1942); Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510
(1941).
35 See Grp. Of Inst. Inv’rs, 318 U.S. at 542.
36 See Marine Harbor Props., 317 U.S. at 85.
33
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among creditors.37 The Court stated that, among classes of creditors, absolute
priority was satisfied if “each security holder in the order of his priority
receives from that which is available for the satisfaction of his claim the
equitable equivalent of the rights surrendered.”38
This statement requires some explanation. Payment in full in reorganization
is not necessarily payment in cash. As Case recognized, it was
clear that [the absolute priority] rule did not “require the impossible,
and make it necessary to pay an unsecured creditor in cash as a
condition of stockholders retaining an interest in the reorganized
company. His interest can be preserved by the issuance, on equitable
terms, of income bonds or preferred stock.”39

In this light, the “equitable equivalent” of Group of Institutional Investors can
be understood to require the valuation of what a plan proposed to exchange for
the old, soon–to–be–discharged debt. But equitable equivalence is a slippery
concept. It lacks mathematical certainty and admits of a wide range of possible
satisfying answers.
The Court acknowledged this fuzziness, but took it as part of the system.
This can be seen from the Court’s 1943 embrace of the woolliness of the
concept in Group of Institutional Investors.40 Speaking through Justice Douglas
again, the Court had this to say:
And in discussing the method by which creditors should receive “full
compensatory treatment” for their rights, we emphasized, as already
noted, that “Practical adjustments, rather than a rigid formula, are
necessary.” . . . Certainly those standards do not suggest any
mathematical formula. We recently stated in another connection that,
whatever may be “the pretenses of exactitude” in determining a dollar
valuation for a railroad property, “to claim for it ‘scientific’ validity,
is to employ the term in its loosest sense.” . . . That is equally true
here. A requirement that dollar values be placed on what each
security holder surrenders and on what he receives would create an

37 318 U.S. at 558. The owners had been already excluded through a lack of sufficient reorganization
value. See id. at 542 (noting the Seventh Circuit’s holding in In re Chi., Milwaukee, Saint Paul & Pac. R.R.,
124 F.2d 754 (7th Cir. 1941), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Grp. of Inst. Inv’rs, v. Chi., Milwaukee,
Saint Paul & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943)).
38 Id. at 565 (emphasis added).
39 Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 117 (1939) (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S.
482, 508 (1912)).
40 318 U.S. at 564.
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illusion of certainty where none exists and would place an
impracticable burden on the whole reorganization process.41

So what is to be used? Earlier cases indicated that courts must take into
account all aspects of a debtor’s business:
Since its application requires a prediction as to what will occur in the
future, an estimate, as distinguished from mathematical certitude, is
all that can be made. But that estimate must be based on an informed
judgment which embraces all facts relevant to future earning capacity
and hence to present worth, including, of course, the nature and
condition of the properties, the past earnings record, and all
circumstances which indicate whether or not that record is a reliable
criterion of future performance.42

In short, the Court required a facts and circumstances inquiry, based around
the reorganized debtor’s future earning capacity. The reluctance to use
information from the market was deliberate: “The criterion of earning capacity
is the essential one if the enterprise is to be freed from the heavy hand of past
errors, miscalculations or disaster, and if the allocation of securities among the
various claimants is to be fair and equitable.”43
Justice Douglas then worked the foundational concept of earning capacity
into an equitable equivalence test:
It is sufficient that each security holder in the order of his priority
receives from that which is available for the satisfaction of his claim
the equitable equivalent of the rights surrendered. That requires a
comparison of the new securities allotted to him with the old
securities which he exchanges to determine whether the new are the
equitable equivalent of the old. But that determination cannot be
made by the use of any mathematical formula.44

So we look at the “equitable equivalent,” a determination that “the use of any
mathematical formula” cannot make.

41

Id. at 565.
Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 526 (1941).
43 Id. This discount can be significant. At least one recent study suggests undervaluation in bankruptcy,
due, in part, to just the debtor’s status as having commenced a case, to be as much as 12%–20%. Michael T.
Roberts, The Bankruptcy Discount: Profiting at the Expense of others In Chapter 11, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 157, 187 (2013).
44 Grp. of Inst. Inv’rs, 318 U.S. at 565–66 (emphasis added).
42
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4. The 1978 Code
A fair question is whether these Supreme Court holdings retain any current
vitality. After all, they were made under a prior statute and referred to
valuation methodologies that most would consider quaint today. An
examination of the history and drafting of current § 1129(b), however,
illustrates that these cases retain their relevance.
The history of § 1129(b) is a history of compromise. One of the largest
compromises was the relaxation of absolute priority as an individual creditor
right, re-characterizing it instead as a class right only (and thus allowing a
majority of creditors to waive the benefit of the rule over the dissent of a
minority).45
Other issues remained, such as whether to replace or rework the “fair and
equitable” standard found in the Act. The Bankruptcy Review Commission,
formed in 1968, knew of the squishiness of the “fair and equitable” standard.
This can be seen from the Commission’s report, which stated that “[a]lthough
market values, liquidation values, and past earnings records may be relevant,
they are not determinative.”46 The report justified this statement by quoting
from Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois: “‘[A]n estimate, as
distinguished from mathematical certitude, is all that can be made.’”47 Against
this background, the report made no new suggestions; it merely acknowledged
the problems this lack of precision caused: “‘Inequities are inevitable’ and any
conception about ‘clear-cut rules about legal priorities is an unrealistic one.’”48
H.R. 6, the first bankruptcy bill introduced after the compromise on
absolute priority referred to above, essentially opted for simple retention.49 It
45 See Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44
STAN. L. REV. 69, 88–90 (1991).
46 EXEC. DIR., COMM’N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. II, at 256 (1973).
47 Id. at 257 (quoting Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 526 (1941)).
48 Id. (quoting Hubert L. Will, Railroad Reorganization—The Long and The Short of It, 41 ILL. L. REV.
608, 626 (1947)).
49 As initially introduced on January 4, 1977, § 1129(b) of H.R. 6 read as follows:

(b) If all of the requirements of subsection (a) of this section other than paragraph (8) are met
with respect to a plan, the court, on request of the proponent of such plan, shall confirm such plan
notwithstanding such paragraph if such plan is fair and equitable with respect to all classes except
any class that has accepted the plan and that is comprised of claims or interests on account of
which the holders of such claims or interests will receive or retain under the plan not more than
would be so received or retained under a plan that is fair and equitable with respect to all classes.
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contained a simple statement of the confirmation standard: a court would
confirm a plan “if such plan were fair and equitable with respect to all classes
except any class that has accepted the plan.”50
Two and one-half months later, the House amended the bill to eliminate the
simple injunction that the plan be “fair and equitable.” In its stead, the
amended bill attempted to define fair and equitable treatment, but without
using the words “fair and equitable.”51 Successive bills added to the statement
of the rule.52 The House Report on the final bill reflected these changes, but
categorized them as a “partial codification” of the absolute priority rule.53
After some procedural wrangling with the Senate, the House’s version of
the bankruptcy bill prevailed.54 But the bill that emerged from the negotiations
between the House and Senate contained a drastically different treatment of
nonconsensual reorganizations. Whereas the House bill described in the House
Report contained only one subsection on nonconsensual confirmation that did
not use the words “fair and equitable,”55 the new bill included two subsections
on the topic, and explicitly incorporated the phrase “fair and equitable.”56
The first subsection harkened back to H.R. 6 by providing that a court
could cram down a non-consensual plan over the dissent of any class only if
H.R. 6, 95th Cong. § 1129(b) (Jan. 4, 1977).
50 Id.
51 H.R. 6, 95th Cong. § 1129(b) (Mar. 21, 1977). This bill was the first to create different categories of
fair and equitable treatment for different types of claims.
52 See H.R. 7330, 95th Cong. § 1129(b) (May 23, 1977); see also H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. § 1129(b) (July
11, 1977); H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. § 1129(b) (Sept. 8, 1977).
53 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 414 (Sept. 8, 1977). The report also confirmed the rule’s focus on returning
only the reorganization value to creditors. It stated that “creditors are entitled to be paid according to the
going-concern value of the business.” Id. at 223.
54 The Senate attempted to substitute a bill sponsored by the Securities and Exchange Commission in
place of the House bill. See S. 2266, 95th Cong. (Oct. 29, 1977). This bill proposed preserving a two-track
reorganization system and required a mandatory trustee for debtors whose equity interests were publicly held.
Id. § 1130. Under this substitute bill, private companies would have been exempt from the fair and equitable
rule. Id. § 1130.
55 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. § 1129(b) (Sept. 8, 1977).
56 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. § 1129(b), as reprinted in 124 CONG. REC. 32,350, 32,376 (1978) (enacted).
Due to these changes, the statements on absolute priority contained in H.R. Rep. No. 595 are not as
authoritative as they might otherwise be. Congress recognized this issue, and in lieu of a Conference Report,
members of Congress read virtually identical statements into both the House and Senate records on the bill.
124 CONG. REC. at 32,391 (statement of Rep. Rousselot). As noted at the time, Congress believed that this
procedure imbued such remarks with “the effect of being a conference report.” Id. The Supreme Court has
concurred. See Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 64 n.5 (1990) (“Because of the absence of a conference and the key
roles played by Representative Edwards and his counterpart floor manager Senator DeConcini, we have treated
their floor statements on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as persuasive evidence of congressional intent.”).
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the plan were, among other things, “fair and equitable.”57 Although the bill
continued past practice and did not attempt to define this concept explicitly,
Congress’s prior efforts to define it were not lost. The second subsection on
cramdown retained the various treatments developed in earlier bills as
examples of fair and equitable treatment.58
These examples were placed in subparagraphs of paragraph (2) of
§ 1129(b).59 In structure, paragraph (2) has three subparagraphs. In order of
priority, these subparagraphs give examples of fair and equitable treatment of
secured claims, unsecured claims, and equity interests. Although a more
detailed examination is reserved for later, the basic thrust of each of these
subparagraphs is that “fair and equitable” treatment includes situations in
which a stakeholder receives property equal in value to the amount of its
prepetition claim or interest. In short, “fair and equitable” treatment includes
satisfaction of the claim.60
These subparagraphs also speak to when the claim is not fully satisfied. In
those circumstances, “fair and equitable” treatment is present if senior interests
are not satisfied only when the plan excludes junior interests from the
reorganization. If unsecured creditors are not paid in full, shareholders cannot
participate.61
As the floor remarks made clear, the list of illustrations was not exhaustive;
courts were not to exclude other components and interpretations.62 The scope
of these unmentioned, yet nonexcluded items, was broad. These included the
57

H.R. 8200 § 1129(b)(1), as reprinted in 124 CONG. REC. at 32,376.
Technically, the bill stated that the fair and equitable treatment “included” the examples. Id.
§ 1129(b)(2).
59 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)–(C) (2012).
60 Or, in the context of an equity interest, delivery of property equal in value to the interest.
There is a somewhat tautological treatment of secured creditors involved in this formulation. Under the
Bankruptcy Code, a creditor holds a secured claim only to the extent of the value of its collateral. See id.
§ 506(a). If the debt exceeds the collateral’s value, the creditor holds two claims: a secured claim equal to the
value of the collateral, and an unsecured claim for the balance. See id. In light of this bifurcation, and because
the proceeds of collateral cannot be allocated to other creditors without compensation to the secured creditor,
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) does not address less than full payment on a secured claim. See id. § 1129(b)(2)(A).
61 Obviously, there are exceptions. If the class of senior interests consents, then shareholders can
participate even if all members of the class are not paid in full. In addition, many courts have recognized that
junior creditors can contribute new value to the reorganization, and obtain interests in the reorganized debtor
commensurate with their contributions. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 7, ¶ 1129.03[4][c].
62 See 124 CONG. REC. at 32,407 (statement of Rep. Edwards); id. at 34,006 (statement of Sen.
DeConcini) (noting “many of the factors interpreting ‘fair and equitable’. . . , which were explicated in the
description of section 1129(b) in the House report, were omitted from the House amendment . . . . [T]he
deletion is intended to be one of style and not one of substance”).
58
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various components of the rule that: provided step-ups to compensate for loss
of priority; compensated junior creditors with better or more quickly
amortizing securities; and increased the amount of the claim protected by the
amount of post-petition interest.63
The most obvious omission, however, was the fundamental idea that no
stakeholder should receive more than its nonbankruptcy entitlement. Put
another way, no creditor should be paid more than what it is owed. This
concept was included in the bill the House originally passed;64 Congress,
however, dropped it in the final bill that became current law. The managers of
the final bill were at pains to point out that this omission did not mean they
were eliminating the requirement: “While that requirement [of no
overpayment] was explicitly included in the House bill, deletion is intended to
be one of style and not one of substance.”65 The floor managers went on to
characterize the no-overpayment rule as a “safeguard” for junior classes.66
Courts have honored this component even though not explicitly
incorporated: “‘It’s undisputed that the “fair and equitable” requirement
encompasses a rule that a senior class cannot receive more than full
compensation for its claims.’”67
B. Summary: Of “Fair Equivalents” and § 1129(b)(2)’s Examples
To summarize, the standard for assessing nonconsensual confirmation is
whether the plan is “fair and equitable” as to each dissenting class. That
standard is found in paragraph (1) of § 1129(b). Congress used “fair and
equitable,” admittedly a vague phrase, to capture reorganization practice in
equity receiverships, and the statutory phrase has guided courts for over 80
years. For purposes of this Article, three short apothegms can synthesize the
history and doctrine under this phrase: “don’t pay too little”; “don’t pay too
much”; and “don’t expect precision.”

63

See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 7, ¶ 1129.03[4][b][i][A]–[C].
See, e.g., H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1129(b) (Mar. 21, 1977).
65 124 CONG. REC. at 32,407 (statement of Rep. Edwards); id. at 34,006 (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
66 124 CONG. REC. at 32,408 (statement of Rep. Edwards); id. at 34,007 (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
67 In re Genco Shipping & Trading Ltd, 513 B.R. 233, 242–43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting In re
Chemtura Corp., 439 B.R. 561, 592 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)); see also In re Exide Techs., 303 B.R. 48, 61, 66
(Bankr. D. Del. 2003); In re MCorp Fin., Inc., 137 B.R. 219, 235 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992); In re Future Energy
Corp., 83 B.R. 470, 495 n.39 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 7,
¶ 1129.03[4][a][ii]. See generally In re Walat Farms, Inc., 70 B.R. 330, 335 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987).
64
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1. Don’t Pay Too Little
The first apothegm, “don’t pay too little,” stems from the examples in
paragraph (2) of § 1129(b). They illustrate that payment in full is “fair and
equitable” treatment. That proposition alone is hardly surprising; you would
not need a bankruptcy law for that proposition. What bankruptcy law provides
is that the payment need not be in cash, but only in “property.” That concept
raises issues of valuation.
2. Don’t Pay Too Much
The second apothegm, “don’t pay too much,” stems from the uncodified
concept of absolute priority that a creditor should not receive more than it is
due. Again, one would not need a bankruptcy law for this proposition; the law
of restitution would otherwise cover it. But again, since noncash property can
constitute payment, the issue remains as to the valuation of the property being
distributed under the plan.
3. Don’t Expect Precision
Finally, the history of reorganization and the Supreme Court’s
interpretations of “fair and equitable” justify the final apothegm: “don’t expect
precision.” As Justice Douglas stated, valuation “requires a prediction as to
what will occur in the future, [and thus] an estimate, as distinguished from
mathematical certitude, is all that can be made.”68 He continued this theme two
years later. When valuing the property a party is receiving in satisfaction of its
claim, “[a] requirement that dollar values be placed on what each security
holder surrenders and on what he receives would create an illusion of certainty
where none exists and would place an impracticable burden on the whole
reorganization process.”69 More recently, finance literature has echoed these
insights: “It is unrealistic to expect or demand absolute certainty in valuation,
since cash flows and discount rates are estimated. This also means that analysts

68

Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 526 (1941).
Grp. of Inst. Inv’rs v. Chi., Milwaukee, Saint Paul & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 565 (1943); see also
Lippe v. Bairnco Corp., 288 B.R. 678, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Common sense and the authorities in the area
suggest that an opinion as to the value of a business should be expressed as a range of values rather than as a
single number.”), aff’d, 99 F. App’x 274 (2d Cir. 2004); Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank v. Ellis, 810 F.2d 700, 706
(7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.) (“‘Fairness’ is a range, not a point.”).
69
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have to give themselves a reasonable margin for error in making
recommendations on the basis of valuations.”70
All of this uncertainty leads back to Justice Douglas’s standard for
assessing whether the value of property offered in a reorganization satisfies
stakeholders’ interests: “It is sufficient that each security holder in the order of
his priority receives from that which is available for the satisfaction of his
claim the equitable equivalent of the rights surrendered.”71 In passing on
whether the plan proponent’s evidence meets this standard of “equitable
equivalence,” Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, stated that the process
“requires a comparison of the new securities allotted to [the stakeholder] with
the old securities which he exchanges to determine whether the new are the
equitable equivalent of the old.”72 Reiterating what he had said in Consolidated
Rock Products, he continued: “But that determination cannot be made by the
use of any mathematical formula.”73
II. THE PROCESS OF PROPERTY VALUATION IN NONCONSENSUAL
CONFIRMATION
At one level, it is all well and good to say that stakeholders are entitled to a
“fair equivalent” when surrendering their prepetition interests. But any
assessment of equivalence requires two other determinations: (1) the value of
the prepetition interest; and (2) the value of the property proposed to be
transferred in reorganization.
The value of the prepetition interest, in the case of unsecured debt, is rather
ministerial. It simply involves calculation of the debt as of the petition date.74
Matters get complicated, however, if the debt is secured, because then the
value of the creditor’s prepetition entitlement includes the value of the
collateral.75 A limit to this complication exists. If the creditor is oversecured—
that is, if its collateral is worth more than the amount of its debt—then the

70 ASWATH DAMODARAN, INVESTMENT VALUATION: TOOLS & TECHNIQUES FOR DETERMINING THE
VALUE OF ANY ASSET 4 (3d ed. 2012); see also ARTHUR KEOWN ET AL., FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT:
PRINCIPLES & APPLICATIONS 751 (6th ed. 2012) (“[N]o single dollar value exists for a company.”).
71 Grp. of Inst. Inv’rs, 318 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2012).
75 See id. § 506(a).
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value of the creditor’s interest is simply the face amount of the debt.76 That
result is the legacy of the “don’t pay too much” line of cases.
But even if a creditor is oversecured, and the value of its prepetition
entitlement can be stated with certainty, there is a further wrinkle. There must
be a valuation of the property the plan proponent proposes to transfer under the
plan in satisfaction of the agreed prepetition entitlement. This property will
rarely be cash (although it could be).77 More often, the property will be a
promise of future payments, such as a promissory note or bond or some other
income-producing security. Such promises are fairly standard in finance, as is
their valuation.
A. Valuing Income Producing Property
Income producing property involves a promise today to make a payment
tomorrow, or at some point in the future. But such a promise is rarely worth the
amount of the promised payment.78 Put simply, a promise to pay $1 tomorrow
is not worth $1 today.
That insight is fairly standard, but it leaves an open question: given that $1
payable tomorrow is not worth $1 today, what is it worth? The study of finance
can and does quantify the difference. It does so under present value analysis.
1. Present Value Analysis
What is “present value”? Start first with an extended example. If you pay
$100 today to a bank for a one-year certificate of deposit, what would you
expect the bank to pay you in a year? The common sense response would be: it
depends on the interest rate being offered by the bank. If 10%, the amount
would be $110; if 5%, the amount drops to $105.79 The bank’s promise to pay
you an amount in the future depends on the interest rate it offers upon deposit.
76 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, 416 (1977) (“It is important to note that under section 506(a), the allowed
amount of the secured claim will not include any extent to which the amount of such claim exceeds the value
of the property securing such claim.”).
77 Id. at 415 (“For example, consider an allowed secured claim of $1,000 in a class by itself. One plan
could propose to pay $1,000 on account of this claim as of the effective date of the plan . . . [This] plan clearly
meets the requirements of subparagraph (A) [of § 1129(b)(2)] because the amount received on account of the
second claim has an equivalent present value as of the effective date of the plan equal to the allowed amount of
such claim.”). See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2).
78 Five years ago, I would have said “never” instead of “rarely,” but the advent of negative interest rates
opens up unexplored areas.
79 These examples use simple, and not compounded, interest rates.
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So the bank could sell you a certificate of deposit—a promise to pay an
amount in the future—by promising to pay $110 for every $100 invested.
Simple math would allow the investor assessing this promise to calculate that
the inherent interest rate on this promise would be 10%. Another way to look
at this analysis is to take the promise of future payment and reduce it or
discount it to today’s value. This process is referred to as calculating present
value.80
In this context, present value is the concept that reduces the face or notional
amount of a stream of projected future payments to adjust for the common
sense insight that $1 a year from now is not worth $1 today. The factor used to
discount the stream is the “discount rate,” usually expressed as a percentage
amount.81
So if a payment of $110 a year from now has a present value today of $100,
the discount rate is 10%. Higher discount rates mean lower present value; were
the discount rate 20% in the prior example, the present value of $110 a year
from now would be $91.67.82 These numbers work in reverse as well.
2. Present Value Analysis and § 1129(b)
What do discount rates have to do with cramdown? There are two separate
explanations. The first has to do with the text of § 1129(b)(2); the second with
finance.
As a matter of statutory interpretation, § 1129(b)(2) requires, in three
places, that a creditor or interest holder receive property “of a value, as of the
effective date of the plan” equal to some amount, usually the allowed amount
of the participant’s claim.83 Congress intended that these words incorporate
present value analysis. As stated in the report accompanying the House bill,
“[t]his [language] contemplates a present value analysis that will discount
80 Present value is represented by the formula PV = P/(1+i)n, where P is the future amount, i is the
discount rate expressed as a decimal, and n is the number of periods discounted.
81 ASWATH DAMODARAN, THE DARK SIDE OF VALUATION: VALUING YOUNG, DISTRESSED AND COMPLEX
BUSINESSES 30 (2d ed. 2010) (“When valuing these cash flows, we have to consider risk somewhere, and the
discount rate is usually the vehicle that we use to convey the concerns that we may have about uncertainty in
the future. In practical terms, we use higher discount rates to discount riskier cash flows and thus give them a
lower value than more predictable cash flows.”). See In re Union Meeting Partners, 165 B.R. 553, 572–73
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994), aff’d, 52 F.3d 317 (3d Cir. 1995).
82 See H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, 415 (1977) (“[T]he higher the discount rate, the less present value the note
will have.”).
83 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II), (B)(i), (C)(i) (2012).
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value to be received in the future.”84 Despite the changes to § 1129(b) after the
conference, this form remained the intended construction: “The House report
accompanying the House bill described what is meant by present value.”85
3. Present Value and Finance
Finance theory also adopts a present value analysis. When comparing the
value of two different streams of income—whether they are the net cash flow
of a business or of a bond—value is expressed in present value terms. In this
analysis, the discount rate is key: it is a single number that represents different
components of risk and reward. In particular, the discount rate will have
among its elements: the risk-free rate of return (traditionally expressed in terms
of United States governmental obligations); a component for inflation; and a
component that measures the risk of repayment. This last component is often
referred to as the risk premium involved in the transaction.86
This risk premium is typically calculated by the obligor’s risk profile, taken
from either its existing financial instruments, or the profiles of similar firms.87
If the whole firm is being valued, the discount rate is typically the firm’s
weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”), which is the cost of the different
components of financing (debt and equity) used by the firm, weighted by their
market value proportions.88 If a bond issue is being valued, the cost of equity
would not be factored in (there is no equity in the equation).89
B. Valuing Debt Issued in Reorganizations
As seen above, the Code requires a present value analysis, and finance
theory offers a relatively simple method of computing the present value of debt
instruments. A quick and facile analysis might indicate that a court should just

84 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, 414 (1977); see id. at 413 (“The property is to be valued as of the effective date
of the plan, thus recognizing the time-value of money.”).
85 124 CONG. REC. 32,407 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 124 CONG. REC. 34,007 (1978)
(statement of Sen. DeConcini).
86 See generally DAMODARAN, supra note 81, at 35–38. For solvent companies, valuation also factors in
the marginal tax rate of the company being valued. Id.
87 Id. at 36.
88 See In re Genco Shipping & Trading Ltd, 513 B.R. 233, 242–43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014).
89 If the debt is secured by all assets of the company, and the relationship between the debt and the
collateral essentially means that the lender would have to take over the business if it foreclosed on its
collateral, WACC might be appropriate, as the promise inherent in the debt instruments is that the debtor will
yield its business if it defaults.
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yield to finance experts to value reorganization debt when assessing
compliance with the absolute priority rule.
At one level, such an analysis likely works. A reorganized debtor will have
cash flow, and that cash flow will stand as security for the reorganization debt
issued. All that remains to be done to value the reorganization debt is to
employ a present value analysis on the cash flow.
Present value analysis, however, requires selecting an appropriate discount
rate. As set forth above, an appropriate discount rate will reflect what is
traditionally thought to be represented in such a rate: (i) a risk-free rate of
return; (ii) compensation for inflation; and (iii) a risk premium.90 Courts,
however, did not uniformly combine or assess these factors in the first twentyfive years under the Code.
III. TILL AND DISCOUNT RATES
Before 2004, courts were all over the map on how to select an appropriate
discount rate.91 Some courts used the contract rate, some attempted to calculate
a creditor’s cost in lending money, and still others tried to craft a debtorspecific interest rate.92 Confusion was common, both in chapter 11 cases and in
chapter 13 cases, in which § 1325(b)(5)(A) uses the same touchstone language
invoking present value.93
A. Till v. SCS Credit
In 2004, however, the Supreme Court addressed the crucial question of
how to select an appropriate discount rate for cramdown, at least in the context
of a chapter 13 case. In Till v. SCS Credit Corp., the discrete issue was the
appropriate cramdown interest rate in chapter 13.94 The Court ultimately
decided to use a formula based approach, beginning with the prime rate of
interest, enhanced by a factor based on the debtor’s riskiness. In particular, the
Court noted the benefits this approach would have:
90

See generally DAMODARAN, supra note 81, at 35–38.
See generally 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 7, ¶ 1129.05[2][c][ii].
92 Id. ¶ 1129.05[2][c][ii][A]–[C].
93 In chapter 13, creditors do not vote on the debtor’s plan. The Code provides that the debtor may
confirm the plan if the creditor retains its lien, and if “the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property
to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such [secured
creditor’s] claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2012). This language closely tracks the language of section
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). See id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).
94 541 U.S. 465 (2004).
91
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[T]he formula approach entails a straightforward, familiar, and
objective inquiry, and minimizes the need for potentially costly
additional evidentiary proceedings. Moreover, the resulting “primeplus” rate of interest depends only on the state of financial markets,
the circumstances of the bankruptcy estate, and the characteristics of
the loan, not on the creditor’s circumstances or its prior interactions
with the debtor. For these reasons, the prime-plus or formula rate best
comports with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.95

The Court was clear, however, that it believed its analysis of chapter 13’s
language had broader application. As the Court saw it:
[T]he Bankruptcy Code includes numerous provisions that, like the
[Chapter 13] cram down provision, require a court to “discoun[t] . . .
[a] stream of deferred payments back to the[ir] present dollar
value,” . . . to ensure that a creditor receives at least the value of its
claim. We think it likely that Congress intended bankruptcy judges
and trustees to follow essentially the same approach when choosing
an appropriate interest rate under any of these provisions.96

Till indicated that a formula approach based upon the prime rate best
carries out the intentions of Congress for those sections which require
discounting to present value.97 The formula approach starts with the prime rate,
and then adjusts the applicable rate upward based on the particular risks
presented by the reorganized debtor.
What is the amount of the increase to be added to the prime rate? The Court
did not directly decide the proper scale for this risk adjustment factor. It did
note, however, that other courts had approved adjustments of one to three
percent (or 100 to 300 basis points), and seemed to suggest that large
adjustments would not be appropriate because a plan cannot be confirmed
unless the bankruptcy court finds that the plan is feasible.

95

Id. at 479–80.
Id. at 474 (internal citations omitted). In a footnote to this passage, the Court identified those sections
of the Code it saw as incorporating similar language requiring use of present value analysis. See id. at 474 n.10
(listing
§§ 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii),
1129(a)(7)(B),
1129(a)(9)(B)(i),
1129(a)(9)(C),
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii),
1129(b)(2)(B)(i), 1129(b)(2)(C)(i), 1173(a)(2), 1225(a)(4), 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii), 1228(b)(2), 1325(a)(4), and
1228(b)(2) as sections of the Code requiring courts to discount future payments back to their present dollar
value).
97 Id. at 479. Although no opinion commanded a majority of five Justices, the plurality opinion of Justice
Stevens, speaking for four Justices, entered a judgment that reversed the decision and ordered further
proceedings consistent with that plurality opinion. Id. at 468. Justice Thomas concurred in that judgment, but
he expressed his view, based upon the language of the statute, that the appropriate rate should be lower,
including no amount to compensate the creditor for risk. Id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring).
96
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B. Till and Chapter 11
Courts have consistently been reluctant to apply Till to chapter 11 cases.
Initially, Till seems directed at minimizing costs in chapter 13 cases, which can
ill afford to host costly disputes. That rationale, while not absent from chapter
11 cases, is certainly minimized in larger chapter 11 cases. In addition, the
Court seemed to be answering a question they would rather have seen the
market answer—what is the appropriate rate to compensate lenders in
bankruptcy? As noted by the Court, “there is no readily apparent chapter 13
‘cram down market rate of interest’: because every cram down loan is imposed
by a court over the objection of the secured creditor, there is no free market of
willing cram down lenders.”98
The Court, however, went on to note that in certain situations bankruptcy
courts can look to market rates. In now-notorious footnote 14, the Court said:
Interestingly, the same is not true in the Chapter 11 context, as
numerous lenders advertise financing for Chapter 11 debtors in
possession . . . . Thus, when picking a cram down rate in a
Chapter 11 case, it might make sense to ask what rate an
efficient market would produce. In the Chapter 13 context, by
contrast, the absence of any such market obligates courts to
look to first principles and ask only what rate will fairly
compensate a creditor for its exposure.99

This footnote 14 has led some courts to apply Till only when it appears
that no efficient market exists for the type of loan at issue.100 One commonality
in these cases has been a tendency to equate the fact that some chapter 11
debtors can obtain exit financing with the presence of an efficient market.
Other courts have simply treated the method employed as a factual matter and

98

Id. at 476 n.14 (plurality opinion).
Id. (citations omitted).
100 See Bank of Montreal v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Am. Homepatient, Inc.), 420
F.3d 559, 568 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[Footnote 14] means that the market rate should be applied in Chapter 11 cases
where there exists an efficient market. But where no efficient market exists for a Chapter 11 debtor, then the
bankruptcy court should employ the formula approach endorsed by the Till plurality. This nuanced approach
should obviate the concern of commentators who argue that, even in the Chapter 11 context, there are
instances where no efficient market exists.”); see also Gen. Elec. Credit Equities, Inc. v. Brice Rd. Devs.,
L.L.C. (In re Brice Rd. Devs., L.L.C.), 392 B.R. 274, 280 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2008); In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.,
419 B.R. 179 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 2010 WL 1223109 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 24, 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, 627 F.3d 496 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Good, 413 B.R. 552 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Good
v. RMR Invs., Inc., 428 B.R. 249 (E.D. Tex. 2010); In re Winn-Dixie Stores, 356 B.R. 239 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2006).
99
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affirmed reasonable efforts by bankruptcy courts to puzzle out the appropriate
discount rate.101
The trend, however, is to the contrary. As recently summarized by the Fifth
Circuit: “[T]he vast majority of bankruptcy courts have taken the Till
plurality’s invitation to apply the prime-plus formula under Chapter 11.”102
When a creditor argued that the Till process produced a rate no lender
would use, and thus was absurd, the Fifth Circuit responded:
While [the lender] is undoubtedly correct that no willing lender
would have extended credit on the terms it was forced to accept under
the § 1129(b) cramdown plan, this “absurd result” is the natural
consequence of the prime-plus method, which sacrifices market
realities in favor of simple and feasible bankruptcy
reorganizations.103

C. Till’s Reference to Efficient Markets
Given this odd policy result, a fair question exists as to whether a court
may ever use market–derived interest rates as the discount factor under
§ 1129(b). That is where footnote 14 comes in. To repeat, it states in relevant
part:
Because every cram down loan is imposed by a court over the
objection of the secured creditor, there is no free market of willing
cram down lenders. Interestingly, the same is not true in the Chapter
11 context, as numerous lenders advertise financing for Chapter 11
debtors in possession . . . . Thus, when picking a cram down rate in a
Chapter 11 case, it might make sense to ask what rate an efficient
market would produce. In the Chapter 13 context, by contrast, the
absence of any such market obligates courts to look to first principles

101 See Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Tex. Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C. (In re Tex. Grand Prairie Hotel
Realty, L.L.C.), 710 F.3d 324, 331 (5th Cir. 2013) (“We will not tie bankruptcy courts to a specific
methodology as they assess the appropriate Chapter 11 cramdown rate of interest; rather, we continue to
review a bankruptcy court’s entire cramdown-rate analysis only for clear error.”).
102 Id. at 333.
103 Id. at 336. Indeed, Justice Thomas essentially took this position in Till: “The dissent might be correct
that the use of the prime rate, even with a small risk adjustment, ‘will systematically undercompensate secured
creditors for the true risks of default.’ This systematic undercompensation might seem problematic as a matter
of policy. But, it raises no problem as a matter of statutory interpretation.” 541 U.S. at 488 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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and ask only what rate will fairly compensate a creditor for its
exposure.104

This passage has been correctly criticized for confusing debtor in
possession financing with exit financing.105 The argument runs that if the Court
used a supporting premise unrelated to its conclusion (that debtor in possession
financing is available), then its conclusion (that the use of market rates “might
make sense”), does not follow. That logical misstep might be enough to raise
questions regarding the propriety of the use of market rates. But the use of
false premises does not necessarily doom a conclusion to the scrapheap. It
might be right for other reasons.
So if we ignore the logical error, what is the rule in chapter 11? All the
Court gives us is a very short and cryptic dicta: “[I]t might make sense to ask
what rate an efficient market would produce.”106
Two points are worth making here. First, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, the phrase “it might make sense to ask” is not all that strong an
indication courts must use market rates when the reorganization debt’s market
is efficient, especially if the selection of a discount rate is a matter of fact.107 In
addition, the Court’s words do not mandate use of market rates; they only
require the bankruptcy court “to ask” what rate an efficient market would
yield.108 If § 1129(b)(2) mandates the use of market rates, that rule will have to
be clarified in further cases.
The second point is more nuanced. Even the strongest advocates for
market-based discount rates must concede that the Court’s dicta states that if
there is no efficient market, prevailing rates are not automatically adopted. In
these circumstances “courts . . . look to first principles and ask only what rate
will fairly compensate a creditor for its exposure.”109 As indicated above, Till
refers to the consideration of market rates in chapter 11 only if there is an
“efficient” market for cram down loans. Is there?

104

Till, 541 U.S. at 476 n.14 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 7, ¶ 1129.05[2][c][i].
106 Till, 541 U.S. at 476 n.14 (plurality opinion).
107 As a determination of fact, review would be controlled by the clearly erroneous standard of review.
See infra Section VI.B.
108 Till, 541 U.S. at 476 n.14.
109 Id.
105
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1. Is There a Market for Cramdown Debt?
To determine whether there is an efficient market for chapter 11 cramdown
loans, the first question to ask is whether there is even a market. This requires
reflection on what a market is. Markets are not necessarily physical; they are
mediums or processes that clear and establish prices on goods or services. At
issue in cramdown situations is the value of a promise. That promise is to
repay certain borrowed sums at a set rate of interest. A facile argument would
run that such promises are brokered every day: car loans, home loans,
corporate bonds, and the like all represent promises for which there appear to
be established markets. Consumers know where and how to shop consumer
loans such as car loans and mortgages; corporations know to go to the capital
markets for floating bonds or issuing other debt securities.
But there are strong commonalities among these types of loans. They each
rely on standard forms. Standard forms pervade consumer loans and bond
indentures.110 Individuals and entities that buy and trade these loans after their
origination thus know their terms, their covenants, and their provisions.
Such may not be the case with cramdown loans. As Till observed in
footnote 14: “Because every cram down loan is imposed by a court over the
objection of the secured creditor, there is no free market of willing cram down
lenders.”111 The Court also noted that the Code
does not require that the terms of the cram down loan match the
terms to which the debtor and creditor agreed prebankruptcy, nor
does it require that the cram down terms make the creditor
subjectively indifferent between present foreclosure and future
payment. Indeed, the very idea of a “cram down” loan precludes the
latter result: By definition, a creditor forced to accept such a loan
would prefer instead to foreclose.112

In short, the nonconsensual nature of reorganization debt issued in a cramdown
may very well exclude it from markets for loans of similar amount or duration
made by non-debtor entities.

110 Standard forms dominate consumer transactions, as every law student who tries to independently draft
a car loan or a mortgage soon finds out. In the world of corporate bond indentures, efforts such as those of the
American Bar Association ensure similarity, if not uniformity, in most bond indenture provisions. See Tr.
Indentures & Indenture Trs. Comm., American Bar Ass’n, Annotated Trust Indenture Act, 67 BUS. LAW. 977
(2012).
111 Till, 541 U.S. at 476 n.14 (2004).
112 Id. at 476.
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But plan proponents may intend to float reorganization debt or other
securities to the public; thus, the reorganized debt or securities may be
designed to be traded on a public market. That reality raises questions about
whether the public markets can fairly price the reorganization debt.
2. If There Is a Market, Is it Efficient?
In Till, Justice Scalia dissented in part because he was willing to assume
that the subprime debt markets that produced the contract at issue were
“competitive and therefore largely efficient.”113 The plurality responded that
“several considerations suggest that the subprime market is not, in fact,
perfectly competitive.”114 These considerations included a disparity of power
between the normal participants, which leads to informational asymmetry, a
condition the Till plurality noted that tends to preclude economic efficiency.115
This raises the question of whether any market in cramdown loans for a
corporate bankruptcy debtor is, or can be, “efficient.”116 Initially, it is unclear
exactly what the Court thought was an “efficient” market. There are many
views on this, but for purposes of this Article, I will discuss two: the lay view
and the economist’s view.
a. “Efficient” as Understood by Non-Economists: The Lay View
The lay view117 likely takes the position that an efficient market is one that
works without much effort because the standard terms and conditions are set,
and only a few points need to be dickered to complete a deal. It is efficient
because people use it in hundreds if not thousands of transactions every day.
The process moves quickly, without any time spent on decisions that do not
seem to matter. Put crudely, an efficient market does not waste anyone’s time.
Car loans, such as the one present in Till, might be thought to represent
such a market. Cars are bought and sold on long, fourteen-inch forms, densely
filled with small type. But the parties typically focus only on several terms,

113

Id. at 492 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 481 (plurality opinion).
115 Id. at 478 (plurality opinion).
116 For purposes of this discussion, I assume that Till referred to notions from economics and finance in
using the term “efficient,” although as indicated below, that may not be an unobjectionable assumption.
117 The concept of a “lay” understanding is my own construct. “Efficient” as used in everyday
conversation has a much different meaning than “efficient” as used by economists. This section tries to capture
the sense non-economists understand when they first hear of the concept of an “efficient” market.
114

MARKELL GALLEYSPROOFS2

116

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

12/15/2016 3:05 PM

[Vol. 33

such as price, trade-in value, and other terms that seemingly have a more direct
and immediate impact on the consumer and the seller. So too with most
consumer loans and mortgages: the forms are standardized so that the debt
obligation can be freely sold and traded in the secondary market.
The abundance of such loans gives some comfort that there is a rate set
without necessary reference to a particular debtor involved. The “market” of
consumer loans determines the general risk for such loans. All a consumer has
to do is to meet the minimum credit score requirements. The Court’s use of the
“prime rate” in Till—a generalized rate offered to banks’ “best customers”—
supports the view that the Court was looking for something extrinsic to the
debtor to validate the discount rate chosen.118
But this method ultimately is unsatisfactory for purposes of chapter 11.
Although there is a market for loans to corporate debtors, it does not exist on
the scale, and with the standardization of, consumer loans. There is more
reason to believe that the terms of a particular loan are set with reference to
subjective evaluations of the creditworthiness of the debtor, rather than with
reference to an objective market place able to assess and price such corporate
loans.
Given the Court’s efforts in Till to arrive at a general rate that compensates
creditors but does not require extensive proof of the debtor’s loan
qualifications, this concept of efficiency is not likely the one Till contemplated
in footnote 14. There is a concept of efficiency, however, in economics and
finance literature, and it is worth looking at.
b. “Efficient” as Understood by Economists
The economists’ view is that prices in an economically efficient market
should, in theory, reflect all relevant information about a business or asset.119
Till recognized this view: “[I]f all relevant information about the debtor’s
circumstances, the creditor’s circumstances, the nature of the collateral, and the
market for comparable loans were equally available to both debtor and
creditor, then in theory the formula and presumptive contract rate approaches
would yield the same final interest rate.”120 In such cases, market prices will

118

Till, 541 U.S. 479–80.
See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J.
FIN. (PAPERS & PROC.) 383, 383 (1970).
120 Till, 541 U.S. at 484.
119
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approximate the value estimated by cash flow and other non-market
measures—sometimes called “intrinsic value.”121 When markets are not
efficient, prices trend away from intrinsic value, a fact that reorganization
cases of the last seventy-five years have recognized.
In the world of finance, the efficient market hypothesis holds that an
efficient market is one in which prices fully reflect all known or available
information about the asset being traded.122 There are several versions of the
efficient market hypothesis: a weak version, in which market prices reflect all
past price patterns; a “semi-strong” version, in which market prices reflect past
price patterns and all other publically available information; and a “strong”
version, in which market prices reflect not only all publicly-available
information, but also all private information held by insiders.123 One
consequence of an efficient market is that no investor can consistently beat the
market and enjoy above-average returns without incurring above-average risks;
the efficiency of the market in absorbing information and reflecting that
information in price changes would defeat any strategy. This notion is captured
by a standard joke:
A well-known story tells of a finance professor and a student who
come across a $100 bill lying on the ground. As the student stops to
pick it up, the professor says, “Don’t bother—if it were really a $100
bill, it wouldn’t be there.”124

Efficiency is treated as having two “flavors”: informational efficiency and
fundamental value efficiency.125 Informational efficiency reflects the market’s
ability to assimilate and distribute new information, and to reflect the
consequence of the information in the asset’s trading price. Fundamental value
efficiency, in turn, is a correlative concept that reflects the market’s ability to
121

DAMODARAN, supra note 81, at 23 (“What is intrinsic value? Consider it the value that would be
attached to an asset by an all-knowing analyst with access to all information available right now and a perfect
valuation model. No such analyst exists, of course, but we all aspire to be as close as we can to this perfect
analyst.”).
122 See, e.g., Fama, supra note 119, at 383 (“A market in which prices always ‘fully reflect’ available
information is called ‘efficient.’”); Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to
the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 639 (2003) (“According to the most common definition, a market is
‘efficient’ when prices always fully reflect available information.”).
123 These distinctions were first developed in Eugene F. Fama, supra note 119, at 383.
124 Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 59, 60 (2003).
As the author notes, this “story well illustrates what financial economists usually mean when they say markets
are efficient.” Id.
125 J. Alex Milburn, The Relationship Between Fair Value, Market Value, and Efficient Markets, 7 ACCT.
PERSP. 293, 298–99 (2008).
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impound or incorporate the new information in a way that reflects fundamental
or intrinsic value.126
There are problems with each form of efficiency. Informational efficiency
has been criticized for its bias towards short-term, easily digestible
information:
Information that is easy to understand and that is trumpeted in the
business media—for example, merger announcements or news of a
stock split—may be incorporated into market prices almost
instantaneously. But information that is “public” but difficult to get
hold of, or information that is complex or requires a specialist’s
knowledge to comprehend, may take weeks or months to be fully
incorporated into prices. Indeed it may never be fully incorporated at
all.127

Fundamental value efficiency examines bias in interpreting and incorporating
public information into prices. As noted by J. Alex Milburn, “[t]here is much
discussion in the literature of potential fundamental value biases in capital
market prices. These include the effects of regulation and transaction costs and
limitations of arbitrage in linking markets and in limiting short selling . . . ; and
cognitive limitations and irrational behavior.”128 Added to this is a fundamental
problem with value efficiency: it cannot be tested. It assumes the mistake in
valuation that it tries to prove the market made. As one author has observed,
“[f]undamental value is not a falsifiable number.”129
There are many reasons to believe that markets in the debt of bankruptcy
debtors are not efficient markets capable of reflecting all relevant information
about a bankruptcy debtor.130 A critique of a pure market valuation perspective
recently stated:
To them, the market appears as their deus ex machina. . . . But the
authors’ preference for market evidence, to the exclusion of expert
opinion, dictates exposure to market ambiguities and inefficiencies.
These include (i) the vague definition of the term “markets”; (ii) the
126

Id. at 298–300.
Stout, supra note 122, at 656.
128 Milburn, supra note 125, at 299.
129 William T. Allen, Securities Markets As Social Products: The Pretty Efficient Capital Markets
Hypothesis, 28 J. CORP. L. 551, 558 (2003).
130 This lack of information and other uncertainties can drive up the discount rate. In one study, for
example, the authors found that creditors in bankruptcy often use an implicit discount rate of over 75%.
Fabrice Barthélémy, Timothy C.G. Fisher & Jocelyn Martel, What Discount Rate Should Bankruptcy Judges
Use? Estimates from Canadian Reorganization Data, 29 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 67, 68 (2009).
127
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challenges particular to valuing a business in distress compared to a
stable company; (iii) the inefficiency of trading distressed securities,
including lack of research coverage and delisting; and (iv) a
presumption that federal judges, schooled in law and not necessarily
in market theory and operation, can intuitively sense distortions and
errors.131

If these cracks in the efficiency market hypothesis generally were not
enough to question its applicability to reorganization securities, then other
concerns might be. Debt securities markets have not been the focus of most of
the efficient market hypothesis literature; equity securities have.132 Courts have
noticed this lacuna; a common observation was made in Newby v. Enron Corp.
(In re Enron Corp. Securities Derivative & “ERISA” Litigation): “No standard
at all appears to have been established for measuring market efficiency for debt
securities. Adding to that difficulty, thus far there is little scholarly literature
about, and only a few courts have addressed, market efficiency for bonds.”133
This uncertainty reflects a continuing debate over efficiency in debt markets in
the academic field as well.134
And although there is very little discussion regarding markets in
bankruptcy, it appears that most studies just assume a lack of any efficient
131 Robert J. Stark, Jack F. Williams & Anders J. Maxwell, Market Evidence, Expert Opinion, and the
Adjudicated Value of Distressed Businesses, 68 BUS. LAW. 1039, 1059–60 (2013).
132 See, e.g., Hui-Ju Tsai, The Informational Efficiency of Bonds and Stocks: The Role of Institutional
Sized Bond Trades, 31 INT’L REV. ECON. & FIN. 34, 34 (2014) (“Although there is extensive research on the
informational efficiency of stock markets, the studies on the informational efficiency of bond markets were
quite limited until . . . 2002.”).
133 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 748 (S.D. Tex. 2006); see also Thomas S. Green, Comment, An Analysis of the
Advantages of Non-Market Based Approaches for Determining Chapter 11 Cramdown Rates: A Legal and
Financial Perspective, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 1151, 1172–75 (2016).
134 See, e.g., Aurelio Fernández Bariviera, M. Belén Guercio & Lisana B. Martinez, Informational
Efficiency in Distressed Markets: The Case of European Corporate Bonds, 45 ECON. & SOC. REV. 349, 351
(2014) (“Corporate bond markets are some of the least studied markets in the financial literature.”); Chris
Downing, Shane Underwood & Yuhang Xing, The Relative Informational Efficiency of Stocks and Bonds: An
Intraday Analysis, 44 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1081, 1081–82 (2009) (noting that because the
“market for corporate bonds has long been relatively opaque[,] . . . previous studies of the relation between
stock and bond returns have drawn conflicting conclusions from dealer quotes of uncertain quality, or narrow
datasets that leave the generality of the results open to question”); Umit G. Gurun, Rick Johnston & Stanimir
Markov, Sell-Side Debt Analysts and Debt Market Efficiency, 62 MGMT. SCI. 682, 682 (2015) (“[T]he public
debt market is on average larger than the equity market . . . , but it is also less liquid and less efficient . . . .”);
Konstantinos Tolikas, The Relative Informational Efficiency of Corporate Retail Bonds: Evidence from the
London Stock Exchange, 46 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS. 191, 192 (2016) (“[C]orporate bonds usually trade in a
rather opaque environment with only a few market professionals that have access to information such as the
prices at which dealers are willing to transact and the actual prices of completed bond trades. As a result, the
literature on various aspects of the corporate bond markets is quite limited and rather inconclusive.”).
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market given the individualized negotiations that occur in bankruptcy when
reaching terms on reorganization debt. As was summarized by Professor
Gilson and others:
The factors that lead to a reliable estimate of value in a market
process are absent in bankruptcy. There is no active market for
control of the assets of the bankrupt firm because it is strongly
discouraged by the structure of Chapter 11. There is no oversight
from the capital markets because management has access to debtorin-possession financing. The securities of bankrupt firms often trade
infrequently. . . . Perhaps as a result, there is very limited analyst
coverage. This absence of market forces makes valuation more
complex and less precise.135

All of these doubts lend credence to the Court’s dubiety over an efficient
market in car loans expressed in Till.136
These ambiguities and inefficiencies have caused some judges to rely upon
matters related to intrinsic valuations. The reason is simple. As stated by Judge
Sontchi: “In the majority of instances in Chapter 11 in which valuation is
implicated, . . . market data will be unavailable or inapplicable.”137
Even if there were efficient debt markets, it is not clear that the price
obtained in such a market will provide the type of value required by the
historic reorganization cases and § 1129(b)(2). First, rates for new loans have
components not appropriate for a cramdown, such as initiation costs and profit
components.138 This fact points to two possible conclusions. First, any court
dealing with so-called market evaluations must reduce the “market” rate to
negate such profit elements. Second, the court should conclude that the market
for bonds or loans generally is not the same market as reorganization debt,
given that reorganization debt has at least an implicit assumption that the debt

135 Stuart C. Gilson, Edith S. Hotchkiss & Richard S. Ruback, Valuation of Bankrupt Firms, 13 REV. FIN.
STUD. 43, 43–44 (2000) (internal citations omitted).
136 Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 481 (2004) (“Moreover, several considerations suggest that the
subprime market is not, in fact, perfectly competitive.”).
137 Christopher S. Sontchi, Valuation Methodologies: A Judge’s View, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 14
(2012).
138 See GMAC v. Valenti (In re Valenti), 105 F.3d 55, 63–64 (2d Cir. 1997), (stating that cramdown is
intended to “put the creditor in the same economic position that it would have been in had it received the value
of its allowed claim immediately. . . . [T]he value of a creditor’s allowed claim does not include any degree of
profit. The purpose is not to put the creditor in the same position that it would have been in had it arranged a
‘new’ loan”).
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will be held to term and not traded. Either one of these conclusions is
inconsistent with an efficient market.
Second, a related notion is that just because there are willing buyers and
sellers of such debt does not mean that there are willing buyers and sellers of
cramdown loans generally—indeed, the whole structure of cramdown seeks to
relieve the debtor and its other creditors of the lack of a seamless market in
reorganization debt. The full and precise payment of secured creditors is a
lesser value than the reorganization of a viable company—so long as the
secured creditor receives the equitable equivalent of the value of its prepetition
debt.
Finally, an efficient market typically assumes that all past and present
relevant information is known to the market participants. While this may be
arguable for general debt securities, it is not tenable for reorganization debt.
Such debt is typically the subject of litigation and negotiation between and
among the relevant parties—with the motives and the offers and counteroffers
remaining private. A debtor in possession, for example, may offer or accept an
interest rate not because it bears some symbiotic relationship to a market rate,
but because it is a compromise for give and take on other issues.
An example might be a lender’s acceptance of a lower rate in return for an
agreement not to pursue preferences or fraudulent transfers—price decisions
particular to the holders of the debt but irrelevant to any market participant
who might buy the debt instrument down the way. Put another way, the rates
the parties demand or offer are not rates designed for a market trade or
necessarily connected to the risks and rewards of the debt to which they are
attached. As Professor Gilson has noted: “U.S. bankruptcy law resolves
valuation through negotiation.”139
IV. MOMENTIVE AND CHAPTER 11
The debate over Till’s application in chapter 11 came to a flash point in
August of 2014 when Bankruptcy Judge Robert Drain of the Southern District
of New York issued a decision confirming a chapter 11 plan for Momentive
Performance Materials Inc. (“Momentive”).140 As chapter 11 plans go, the
broad structure of Momentive’s plan was fairly vanilla financial restructuring:
139

Gilson, Hotchkiss & Ruback, supra note 135, at 44.
Momentive, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 WL 4436335 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014), aff’d, 531 B.R.
321 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-1771 (2d Cir. filed June 1, 2015).
140
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junior levels of debt agreed to cancel their interests, contribute cash, and
receive all the equity interests in the reorganized debtor.141 All interests, debt
or equity, junior to them would be eliminated.142 General unsecured creditors
would be undisturbed and paid in full.143 Secured creditors would be paid in
accordance with the Code.144
This last point, however, proved contentious. There was no agreement on
what the secured creditors were due, or what constituted permissible treatment
of their claims. For their part, the secured creditors, who were oversecured,
believed that they were owed not only their principal and accrued interest, but
also a “make whole” premium—a sum of cash calculated to compensate a
lender for prepayment of an above-market loan. The debtors countered that
such make whole premiums were not payable under the loan documents, and in
any event ran contrary to the Code’s disallowance of unmatured interest.
As an alternative to litigating the dispute, the debtor proposed a plan with a
so-called “death trap” voting provision145: if the class of secured creditors
voted for the plan, the class members would receive a cash payment equal to
their principal and accrued interest, albeit without any payment of a contested
make whole premium.146
If, however, the secured creditor class rejected the plan, the cash payment
was off the table. Instead, the debtor would cram down the secured creditors’
claims over approximately seven years at an interest rate of 4.1% to 4.85%,147
a rate not only below that stated in the original debt instruments, but also
below what Momentive had agreed to pay to obtain a loan facility to take out
the lenders had they accepted the plan. Indeed, when Momentive filed its Form
10-K after consummating its plan, it estimated that the rate ultimately imposed

141

See Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization for Momentive Performance
Materials Inc. & Its Affiliated Debtors at 28–54, Momentive, No. 14-22503-rdd (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9,
2014), ECF No. 516, 2014 WL 4255110, at *28–54.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Momentive, 2014 WL 4436335, at *11. These provisions are often called “toggle provisions,” or “fishor-cut-bait” provisions.
146 Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization for Momentive Performance
Materials Inc. & Its Affiliated Debtors, supra note 141, at 35–36. Make whole premiums are amounts payable
upon payment of a loan before maturity that are designed to compensate a lender for the interest that will not
accrue due to early payment.
147 Id. The rate in the plan was even lower; Judge Drain increased the risk premium by 50 basis points, or
0.5% overall. Momentive, 2014 WL 4436335, at *32.
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was approximately 87% of what a market rate would be.148 Some
commentators have estimated that this discount cost the secured creditors $200
million.149
Intense debate has followed Judge Drain’s decision.150 This Article takes
the position that his decision was correct, and should be affirmed, even though
it was not the only correct decision that could have been made.
A. The Debtor
Momentive was in the silicone business. It had over $2.1 billion in sales in
the year before bankruptcy and employed over 4,500 people. It also had been
the subject of a leveraged buyout from Apollo Global Management in 2006.151
It also had a lot of debt—more than 16 times its annual cash flow before taxes
and depreciation.152
B. The Secured Parties
Much of Momentive’s debt was incurred in 2012, when Momentive had
issued two classes of senior secured notes. The first series, in the amount of
$1.1 billion, was issued at an interest rate of 8.875% (“First Lien Notes”).153
The second series, in the amount of $250 million, was issued at an interest rate
of 10% (“1.5 Lien Notes”).154 Both the First Lien Notes and the 1.5 Lien Notes
matured in 2020.155 Both series were secured by all or virtually all of
Momentive’s assets.
Momentive issued a third series of secured notes in 2010. These notes were
in the aggregate principal amount of $1.161 billion, and were secured by the
same assets, but were contractually junior in priority to the First Lien Notes

148

Momentive Performance Materials, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 51 (Mar. 30, 2015).
Michael Vitti, Taking a Deeper Look into Momentive, Part 1, QUICKREAD (Dec. 22, 2015), http://
quickreadbuzz.com /2015/12/22/taking-a-deeper-look-into-momentive-part-1/.
150 See, e.g., Alec P. Ostrow, Chapter 11 Cramdown Interest Rates: The Momentum Tilts Toward Chapter
13, in 2015 NORTON ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 3; Mark J. Thompson & Katie M. McDonough, Lost in
Translation: Till v. SCS Credit Corp. and the Mistaken Transfer of a Consumer Bankruptcy Repayment
Formula to Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 893, 923 (2015).
151 Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization for Momentive Performance
Materials Inc. & Its Affiliated Debtors, supra note 141, at 17–23.
152 Id. at 28.
153 Id. at 24.
154 Id. at 25.
155 Id. at 24–25.
149
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and the 1.5 Lien Notes.156 They were set to mature in 2021.157 Apollo, who had
engineered Momentive’s leveraged buyout, held most of the notes. It also
beneficially held most of the equity in the debtor.158
C. Confirmation and Cramdown
Momentive’s disclosure statement indicated that it had a debt-free value of
somewhere between $2 billion and $2.4 billion.159 No party seriously
challenged this entity valuation,160 even though this valuation put Apollo’s
Second Lien Notes at risk of being at least partially undersecured while
confirming that the First Lien Notes and the 1.5 Notes were oversecured. At
the same time, the prepetition debt service on all Momentive’s debt was
approximately $288 million per year, some $200 million more than its earnings
before taxes and depreciation.161
To reduce this debt service, Momentive sought to take advantage of the fact
that the market had changed from 2012 when it had issued the First and 1.5
Lien Notes—interest rates had dropped significantly. In such circumstances, it
is textbook bankruptcy law that a debtor can cram down a secured creditor’s
claim by giving it a continuing lien on its collateral and a stream of payments
that has a present value equal to the allowed amount of its claim.162 This
treatment favors debtors because the interest rate necessary to discount the
stream of payments will track interest rates extant at the time of the bankruptcy
filing. Using these reduced rates, a debtor can essentially unilaterally refinance
its existing debt at lower rates.
But the lenders had anticipated this strategy. Their loan documents required
Momentive to pay make whole premiums in the case of any prepayment.163
Essentially, a make whole premium is an amount equal to the lost interest
156

Id. at 25.
Id.
158 Id. at 27 (noting Apollo owned a “significant portion of the Second Lien Notes”).
159 Notice of Filing of Certain Exhibits to Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of
Reorganization for Momentive Performance Materials Inc. & Its Affiliated Debtors at 43, Exhibit C, In re
MPM Silicones, LLC (Momentive), No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 WL 4436335 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2014),
aff’d, 531 B.R. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-1771 (2d Cir. filed June 1, 2015), 2014 WL
2917134, at *43.
160 See Momentive, 2014 WL 4436335, at *10.
161 Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization for Momentive Performance
Materials Inc. & Its Affiliated Debtors, supra note 141, at 26–28.
162 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 7, ¶ 1129.04[2][a].
163 See Momentive, 2014 WL 4637175, at *10.
157
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between (1) what was originally agreed to be paid if the loan were held to
maturity; and (2) the interest paid to the date of the prepayment. In the end, the
goal is to put the secured creditor in the same position as if the loan had not
been repaid.164
Momentive, understandably, did not want to pay that much. So it proposed
a plan under which, if the noteholder classes accepted, Momentive would pay
cash to the First Lien Notes and the 1.5 Lien Notes in an amount equal to their
face amount, along with accrued interest.165 The amounts to be paid, however,
did not include any amount allocable to the make whole premiums.166
Momentive would finance this payment by borrowing money under a facility
previously obtained at the time of the bankruptcy filing.167
If the noteholders rejected this proposed treatment, Momentive created a
“death trap”: a different and less favorable treatment if it had to confirm the
plan over the note holders’ objections. The less favorable treatment still
purported to pay the note holders in full, without payment of the make whole
premium.168 Momentive no longer, however, would pay cash.169 Rather, it
proposed to give a note that would pay the claims over time at an interest rate
crafted according to Till.
This crafted interest rate, to no one’s surprise, was low—the debtor keyed
the rate payable to the seven-year Treasury note rate plus 1.5% for the First
Lien Notes, and the same Treasury note rate plus 2% for the 1.5 Lien Notes.170
These rates worked out initially to be 3.6% on the First Lien Notes and 4.1%
on the 1.5 Lien Notes.171 In short, they went for broke in suggesting Till
controlled. Judge Drain gave reasoned support to their position.

164 See Bruce A. Markell, “Shoot the. . .”: Holes in Make Whole Premiums, 36 BANKR. L. LETTER No. 5
(Thomson Reuters, St. Paul, Minn.), May 2016, at 1, 2–3, 4, for my discussion of the make-whole premiums
issues in Momentive.
165 Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization for Momentive Performance
Materials Inc. & Its Affiliated Debtors, supra note 141, at 35–36.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 40. The interest rate payable on this facility was more than the proposed interest rate on the
replacement notes.
168 Id. at 35–36.
169 Id.
170 Momentive, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 WL 4436335, at *24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014), aff’d, 531
B.R. 321 (S.D.N.Y 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-1771 (2d Cir. filed June 1, 2015).
171 Id.
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D. Till Adopted; Market Spurned
Judge Drain started his analysis by restating Till: in chapter 13, the
applicable statute does not require a market-based analysis, but rather permits a
discount rate tied to the prime rate.172 He then assessed whether the Court’s
interpretation of chapter 13’s provision, § 1325(a)(5), had relevance in chapter
11. He found it did, quoting the Supreme Court to the effect that: “Congress
likely intended bankruptcy judges and trustees to follow essentially the same
approach when choosing an appropriate interest rate under any of the many
Code provisions requiring a court to discount a stream of deferred payments
back to their present dollar value.”173
From this perspective, he compared §§ 1325(a)(5) and 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II)
and concluded that “there is no sufficiently contrary basis to distinguish the
chapter 13 and chapter 11 plan contexts in light of the similarity of the
language of the two provisions and the underlying present value concept that
Till recognized should be applied uniformly throughout the Code.”174 Judge
Drain then categorized and dismissed, as did the Court in Till, various marketbased discount rates produced by the coerced loan and presumptive contract
rate. These methods sought to give the secured creditor in essence a refinanced
new loan by using a discount rate provided by the market and the individual
costs of the creditor.
As the bankruptcy court stated, “[t]he purpose is not to put the creditor in
the same position that it would have been in had it arranged a ‘new’ loan.”175
So what was the goal? As Judge Drain noted:
Till distinguished the cramdown rate from market loans; the former
does not require the lender to be indifferent compared to the result in
a foreclosure, where the creditor could then re-lend the proceeds in
the marketplace, and should not “overcompensate[] creditors because
the market lending rate must be high enough to cover factors, like
lenders’ transaction costs and overall profits, that are no longer
relevant in the context of court-administered and court-supervised
cramdown loans.”176

172
173
174
175
176

Id. at *23–24.
Id. at *24 (quoting Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 474 (2004)).
Id. at *24.
Id. at *25 (quoting In re Valenti, 105 F.3d 55, 63–64 (2d Cir. 1997)).
Id. (quoting Till, 541 U.S. at 476–77).
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The cramdown rate analysis, therefore, should focus on a rate that does not
take market factors into account but, rather, starts with the riskless rate
applicable to all obligations to be paid over time, adjusted for the risks unique
to the debtor in actually completing such payment.177
Judge Drain then restated how to apply a Till formula-based rate:
Under the formula approach, the proper rate for secured lenders’
cramdown notes begins with a risk-free base rate, such as the prime
rate used in Till, or the Treasury rate used in GMAC v. Valenti (In re
Valenti), which is then adjusted by a percentage reflecting a risk
factor based on the circumstances of the debtor’s estate, the nature of
the collateral security and the terms of the cramdown note itself, and
the duration and feasibility of the plan.178

The risk factor adjustment then concerned the court. After noting that Till
stated that “no adjustment whatsoever to the risk-free rate would be required if
the Court found that the debtors were certain to perform their obligations under
the replacement notes,”179 the court concluded that market-based assessments
of a discount rate particular to Momentive were not to be considered. As Judge
Drain summarized:
Therefore, as a first principle, the cramdown interest rate, under
section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Code, should not contain any
profit or cost element, which were rejected by Till and the Second
Circuit in Valenti as inconsistent with the present-value approach for
cramdown purposes. In addition, market-based evidence should not
be considered, except, arguably and, if so secondarily, when setting a
proper risk premium in the formula approach taken by Till and
Valenti.180

But what about footnote 14 and its suggestion of possibly different
treatment for chapter 11 debtors? Judge Drain dismissed these arguments.
First, he noted that the Supreme Court meant footnote 14 to acknowledge the
involuntary nature of cramdown. The purpose of cramdown is not to provide
property to creditors under terms that they would voluntarily make; it is to
deliver to creditors a fair equivalent of their entitlements, even though the

177

Id. (quoting Till, 541 U.S. at 477–78) (citations omitted).
Id. at *26.
179 Id. The court quoted the Supreme Court: “We note that if the Court could somehow be certain a debtor
would complete his plan, the prime rate would be adequate to compensate any secured creditors forced to
accept cramdown loans.” Id. (quoting Till, 541 U.S. at 479 n.18).
180 Id.
178
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creditor may not agree.181 Second, he noted the inapplicability of the Court’s
reference in footnote 14 to debtor in possession financing to cramdown
discount rates; the two types of loans operate on completely different
assumptions.182 Finally, Judge Drain rejected the creditor’s argument that
market rates should control when the market is efficient. The creditors argued
that this criterion was satisfied if, as was the case with Momentive, there was
trading in the debt.183 Judge Drain rejected this argument, pointing out that the
Court itself in Till was not convinced that the market for auto loans—
ubiquitous and numerous as they may be—was an efficient market.184
The bankruptcy court then argued that Till was inconsistent with a two-step
process taken by other courts—that is, figure out if a market is efficient, and
then, only if it is not, apply Till.185 The disconnect is that reorganization
discount values are not market substitutes; it is simply not the case that the
goal is to give the creditor property that the creditor can immediately turn
around and sell and receive 100% of its claim.
The creditors next made a superficially appealing argument. The debtor had
negotiated and obtained a take-out facility of over $1 billion to pay the note
holders in case they accepted the plan.186 That facility carried a higher rate than
the cramdown rate proposed, a rate closer to 6% than to the 4% offered.187
Since the loan facility was specific to Momentive, the creditors contended its
interest rate should be used as the discount rate.
Judge Drain rejected this argument.188
[I]t is clear to me that no private lender, including the lenders who the
debtors have obtained backup takeout commitments from, would lend
without a built-in profit element, let alone recovery for costs and fees,
which also, as discussed above, is contrary to Till and Valenti’s first
principles and the purpose of section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II).189
181

Id.
Id. at *27.
183 The creditors believed such a market existed for the reorganizations debt. The creditors’ opening brief
on appeal to the district court contained a graph of the market trading in the First Lien and 1.5 Lien notes.
Reply Brief for Appellants at 4, BOKF, NA v. Momentive Performance Materials, Inc. (In re MPM Silicones,
LLC), 531 B.R. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (Nos. 14 CV 7471(VB), et al.), ECF No. 17.
184 Momentive, 2014 WL 4436335, at * 27.
185 Id. at *28.
186 Id. at *29.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
182
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The creditors then engaged in a battle of the experts over the relative risk
factors—the “plus” factor Till requires to be added to the base rate chosen.190
In this regard, the court was performing the time-honored function of a trial
court in assessing the credibility and veracity of witnesses. In this case, the
debtor’s witnesses won.191 The court found that “a risk premium of 1.5 and 2
percent, respectively, for the two series of replacement notes is appropriate.”192
The court did, however, change the base rate used.193 In In re Valenti, a Second
Circuit case under chapter 13, the court had used the United States Treasury
note rate as its base rate.194 As the court noted in Momentive, the Treasury note
rate “is often used as a base rate for longer-term corporate debt such as the
replacement notes.”195 There is a difference between the prime rate and the rate
for Treasury notes: the Treasury rate is assumed to be riskless, while the prime
rate has some risk built into it.
As a result, the court thought that “there should be an additional amount
added to the risk premium in light of the fact that the debtors used Treasury
rates as the base rate.”196 The court added an additional increment of 0.5% for
the first lien replacement notes, and an additional 0.75% for the 1.5 lien
replacement notes.197 Given that the seven-year Treasury rate was 2.1%, the
court thus assigned a reorganization discount rate of 4.1% and 4.85% for the
reorganization notes.198
The final rate contrasts with the then-prime rate of 3.25%, the exit
financing rate of approximately 5% to 6%,199 and the fact that these rates were
almost a third of the 11% WACC that Momentive’s own advisors had used in
calculating reorganization value.200 Momentive would later estimate that these

190

Id. at *30.
Id. at *31.
192 Id. at *30. The court had noted that “the debt under the replacement notes is approximately 50 to 75
percent less than the value of the collateral therefor, and closer to 50 percent than 75 percent. Gross debt
leverage also will substantially decrease under the plan, from 17.8 percent to 5.6 percent, or from $4.4 billion
in debt down to $1.3 billion.” Id.
193 Id. at *31–32.
194 105 F.3d 55, 64–65 (2d Cir. 1997).
195 Momentive, 2014 WL 4436335, at *32.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id. at *34.
200 Momentive Performance Materials, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 148, at 51.
191
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reorganization discount rates were approximately 87% of what market rates
would have been.201
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN SELECTING A DISCOUNT RATE
Any analysis of the application of Till’s formula rate in chapter 11 cases
analysis must start with an examination and specification of the role and
purpose of discount rates in cramdown. Creditors urge that
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) requires them to receive property that has a “value, as of
the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder’s interest in
the estate’s interest in such property.”202 They contend that the proper value is
market value; their debt should be worth on the petition date what a third party
would be willing to pay for it. Put another way, “the value of [the creditor’s]
interest” in its collateral is the value the market ascribed to that note. If
conceded, then the hunt for a discount rate the market would assign is very
relevant.
A. The Rejection of a Market Rate as Constituting Irrebuttable Evidence of a
Proper Cramdown Interest Rate
But doctrine and history belie this argument. Initially, the starting point is
not § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II). It is § 1129(b)(1). Paragraph (1) sets the standard
for cramdown—that the plan be “fair and equitable” as to the dissenting class;
the treatments listed in paragraph (2) are but examples of that treatment. As
shown above,203 and as relevant to cramdown, there are three principles
involved: “don’t pay too little”; “don’t pay too much”; and “don’t expect
precision.”
With respect to the minimum payment under the “fair and equitable”
standard, the Supreme Court has been clear for almost seventy-five years that
the standard is one of a “fair equivalent” exchange. That is, the property the
plan offers offered must be the “fair equivalent” of the property surrendered;
the reorganization debt received must be the fair equivalent of the pre-petition
debt discharged. This much may not be objectionable at a high level of
abstraction: who can argue against a “fair equivalent”?

201
202
203

Id.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2012).
See supra section II.B.
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1. Evidence That Congress Does Not Always Adopt Market Rates in
Reorganization
What does rankle secured creditors is that “fair equivalents” under Till and
its progeny may leave them with property they cannot sell for the amount of
the debt discharged. This result was not unanticipated. When Congress adopted
the 1978 Code, it left in place the “fair and equitable” standard. The 1973
Commission explicitly decided to continue the standard,204 although it made
the standard “more flexible.”205 As to the application of the “fair and
equitable” standard to reorganizations, the Commission made no new
suggestions. It merely acknowledged the problems this lack of precision in the
term could cause: “‘Inequities are inevitable’ and any conception about ‘clearcut rules about legal priorities is an unrealistic one.’”206
Indeed, the Code itself has several provisions that skew values in
reorganization away from a market-based result. Section 1129(a)(7), for
example, accepts the fact that a creditor with a debt bearing a below-market
interest rate may receive less in reorganization than in liquidation.207 Section
511 mandates an interest rate set by non-bankruptcy law for governmental
entities.208
These exceptions lead away from pure market results. As a more recent
court has phrased it,
[w]hile [the lender] is undoubtedly correct that no willing lender
would have extended credit on the terms it was forced to accept under
the § 1129(b) cramdown plan, this “absurd result” is the natural
consequence of the prime-plus method, which sacrifices market
realities in favor of simple and feasible bankruptcy
reorganizations.209

204

THE COMM’N

ON THE

BANKRUPTCY LAWS

OF THE

UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 2

(1973).
205

Id. cmt. 6.
Id. pt. 1 (quoting Will, supra note 48, at 626).
207 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7). The best interest test applies only to impaired creditors. Id.
§ 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii). If a creditor with a below market rate of interest is left unimpaired under § 1124, then the
value of the property received will be less than they would have received in liquidation.
208 See id. § 511 (specifying that non-bankruptcy rates of interest should be used for certain types of
claims held by governmental entities).
209 In re Tex. Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C., 710 F.3d 324, 336 (5th Cir. 2013).
206
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2. Protecting Restrictions on Potential Overpayment
To put it in simple terms, the full and precise payment of secured creditors
is a lesser value than the reorganization of a viable company—so long as the
secured creditor receives the equitable equivalent of the value of its prepetition debt.210
Why tolerate this less-than-full market-based compensation? It is a version
of the “don’t pay too much” argument. Lower valuations of collateral (and of
businesses) result in reduced or eliminated participation for junior interests.211
If the lower valuation results from the use of a metric that factors in a
bankruptcy taint, there is a policy position that such reduction or elimination is
improper and unfair. As stated in In re New York, New Haven and Hartford
R.R., “[t]he stigma of bankruptcy alone is a factor that will seriously depress
the market value of a company’s securities.”212 After all, reorganization is
supposed to result in a rescue based on future prospects; and the use of a
tainted discount rate would then set the participation in that future venture at
values at odds with the goal.
On this point, the American Bankruptcy Institute’s recent chapter 11 study
goes astray.213 The Commission’s Report recommended market-based interest

210 There is a relationship between risk factors under Till and the feasibility requirement of § 1129(a)(11).
Paragraph (11) only requires that the court find it more likely than not that a plan is feasible; the risk factors
contemplated by Till would seem to involve assessing success above the simple more likely-than-not stage.
Accord Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 466 (2004); see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11).
211 See In re 620 Church St. Corp., 299 U.S. 24, 27 (1936).
212 4 B.R. 758, 791 (D. Conn. 1980). The Third Circuit echoed this concern in In re Penn Central
Transportation Co.:

[The parties have argued that] the market can be expected irrationally to undervalue the securities
of a once-distressed company emerging from a lengthy reorganization. In re Missouri Pac. R. R.,
39 F. Supp. 436, 446 (E.D.Mo.1941); See also Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate
Reorganization, 17 U.Chi.L.Rev. 565, 566–69 (1950). That argument has considerable force
when the securities in issue represent equity in, or long term interest bearing obligations of, a
reorganized debtor. In such cases, the market value of the security will depend upon the investing
public’s perception of the future prospects of the enterprise. That perception may well be unduly
distorted by the recently concluded reorganization and the prospect of lean years for the
enterprise in the immediate future. Use of a substitute “reorganization value” may under the
circumstances be the only fair means of determining the value of the securities distributed.
596 F.2d 1102, 1115–16 (3d Cir. 1979).
213 COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM
RECOMMENDATIONS 234–37 (2014).

OF

CHAPTER 11, AM. BANKR. INST., FINAL REPORT
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rates be used in cramdown situations.214 Specifically, the Report stated that
courts should look at many factors and reject a straight application of Till:
In selecting the appropriate discount rate, the court should consider
the evidence presented by the parties at the confirmation hearing and,
if practicable, use the cost of capital for similar debt issued to
companies comparable to the debtor as a reorganized entity, taking
into account the size and creditworthiness of the debtor and the
nature and condition of the collateral, among other factors. If such a
market rate is not available or the court determines that an efficient
market does not exist, the court should use an appropriate riskadjusted rate that reflects the actual risk posed in the case of the
reorganized debtor, considering factors such as the debtor’s industry,
projections, leverage, revised capital structure, and obligations under
the plan. The court should not apply the “prime plus” formula
adopted by the Supreme Court in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S.
465 (2004) in the chapter 11 context.215

As stated in the Report, “[t]he objective is to make sure payments received
by the secured creditor in the future represent the value of its secured claim on
the effective date.”216 To achieve this goal, the Report further states that
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) should provide creditors with deferred cash payments that
reflect economic realities. Section 1129(b)(2)(A), the Report contends,
was intended to provide the secured creditor with the value of its
allowed secured claim as of the effective date of the plan, even if that
amount would be paid over an extended period of time. In other
words, the secured creditor should receive the same return, regardless
of whether the debtor elects to pay the allowed secured claim in cash
on the effective date or through deferred cash payments over several
years. Accordingly, the discount rate applied to the deferred cash
payments should reflect the economic realities of the case, including
the rate of interest available on similar debt and risks associated with
the future income stream available to fund the payments.217

This discussion is odd for several reasons. First, the Commission read
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) without any acknowledgment that it constitutes an example of
the more general and controlling standard of “fair and equitable” as used in
§ 1129(b)(1). Second, the Commission did not consider the history and
doctrine of the “fair and equitable” doctrine, nor any discussion of any
214
215
216
217

Id. at 234–37.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 236–37.
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Supreme Court decision before Till discussing the “fair and equitable”
standard. Finally, there is no hint that valuation methods might be imprecise,
and that this imprecision could hurt, as well as help, both debtors and creditors.
In short, it is a one-sided discussion, focusing on what I have called the “don’t
pay too little” question, while ignoring the “don’t pay too much” and “don’t
expect precision” inquiries.
Not surprisingly, the Commission rejected Till, but it is unclear exactly on
what grounds. The Commission’s Report states that “the discount rate used in
that prime plus formula is not based on the economic realities of the particular
case. Consequently, this interpretation likely undercompensates creditors for
the risk present in the post-confirmation credit.”218
This statement is also odd in that it ignores legitimate interests of plan
proponents by focusing solely on the creditor’s interest in compensation. By
trying to ensure secured creditors receive “at least” the amount of their secured
claim,219 the Commission’s Report fails to appreciate that anything over that
amount, caused by errors in inputs or methodologies, is overcompensation that
deprives participation for holders of junior interests. The Commission’s Report
appears to believe that precise values can be placed on reorganization
securities (or that any market for these new securities would reliably price
them), thus ignoring my final apothegm, “don’t expect precision.”
The Commission’s Report also does not address one of Judge Drain’s other
concerns from Momentive. As he noted, rates for loans priced by the market
have components not appropriate for a cramdown, such as initiation costs and
profit components.220 Allowing valuations methodologies that include this
component decreases valuation at the expense of junior creditors—a further
example that would violate the general principle of “don’t pay too much.”

218

Id. at 237.
Id. at 234.
220 Judge Drain quoted In re Valenti in stating that cramdown is intended to “put the creditor in the same
economic position it would have been in had it received the value of its allowed claim immediately . . . the
value of a creditor’s allowed claim does not include any degree of profit. The purpose is not to put the creditor
in the same position that it would have been in had it arranged a ‘new’ loan.” Momentive, No. 14-22503-rdd,
2014 WL 4436335, at *25 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014), aff’d, 531 B.R. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), appeal
docketed, No. 15-1771 (2d Cir. filed June 1, 2015) (quoting 105 F.3d 55, 63–64 (2d Cir. 1997)).
219
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3. The Role of Precision and Expectations
The rejection of a pure market-based method also borrows from the “don’t
expect precision” argument. As the Supreme Court stated early on in Group of
Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, Saint Paul & Pacific R. R. Co.:
“[W]hatever may be ‘the pretenses of exactitude’ in determining a dollar
valuation for a railroad property, ‘to claim for it “scientific” validity, is to
employ the term in its loosest sense.’”221 Indeed, some inaccuracy is to be
expected. To be efficient, markets need information, and that relevant
information may be scarce or conflicting in a chapter 11 case, either because of
uncertainty over the legal issues involved,222 omnibus deals made that only
incidentally affect the rationality of the discount rate,223 or just the mass of
information disseminated in the chapter 11 case.224
The history of valuation in bankruptcy supports the Supreme Court’s
wariness. Courts have shifted among valuation methodologies over time, from
capitalized earnings to discounted cash flow to beta analysis.225 Indeed, new
methods may be on the horizon in terms of the use of credit derivatives.226
Reducing or eliminating a stakeholder’s rights and participation on the basis of
the latest product of financial wizardry may be unfair to those holding junior
interests, especially when Congress has not specified any particular interest
rate to be used, which it has done in other areas.227
B. Not Irrebuttable, But Not Irrelevant Either
Does this mean that market rates are irrelevant? The answer is no, but that
answer has more to do with valuation procedure and how courts view valuation
methodologies than anything else. Start first with the nature of the decision the
bankruptcy court has to make. The statute requires the court to determine the
221 318 U.S. 523, 565 (1943) (quoting Nashville, Chattanooga & Saint Louis Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S.
362, 370 (1940)).
222 In Momentive, in addition to the ultimate decisions on whether the inter-creditor agreements allowed
Apollo to sponsor Momentive’s plan, the resolution of the issues of the validity of make whole premiums, and
of the applicable discount rate were unknown before Judge Drain’s ruling. See Momentive, 2014 WL 4436335,
at *19–20.
223 Id. at *11.
224 See, e.g., In re N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 4 B.R. 758, 791 (D. Conn. 1980).
225 See generally Michael Simkovic, The Evolution of Valuation in Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. L.J.
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 1), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2810622.
226 Id. at 5–6.
227 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 511 (2012) (specifying interest rate to be used in plan for certain types of debt
owed to government entities).
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present value of the reorganization debt, which will usually be the valuation of
a promise. How is that done? As the Supreme Court determined, speaking
through Justice Douglas: “Whether in a given case senior creditors have been
made whole or received ‘full compensatory treatment’ rests in the informed
judgment of the [the trier of facts] on consideration of all relevant facts.”228
Does this mean that the selection of an appropriate discount rate is an issue of
fact or an issue of law?229
The characterization matters. If an issue of fact, then the bankruptcy court
could be reversed only if the selection of a particular method of valuation was
clearly erroneous. This could happen, for example, if the bankruptcy court
spurned the use of future earnings in conducting its valuation and focused only
on past offers to buy the business.230 If an issue of law, however, then a de
novo standard of review applies, with the appellate court in a position to
choose the appropriate valuation method.
Courts are somewhat conflicted over the appropriate characterization.231 As
recently stated in Alberts v. HCA, Inc., however, the authorities “stating that a
bankruptcy court’s valuation determinations are issues of fact” are in fact
“more persuasive and appear to represent the majority view.”232 If followed,
this characterization gives bankruptcy courts, as the initial trier of fact, great
latitude to adopt and adapt valuation methodologies—so long as they adhere to
the general guidelines that they must look to the future, not to the past.
Might a bankruptcy court consider market rates in its determination of an
appropriate discount rate? The answer is yes, if done cautiously. If the rates
228

Grp. Of Inst. Inv’rs v. Chi., Milwaukee, Saint Paul & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 565 (1943).
For an excellent article that touches on many of this issues in this section, see Anthony J. Casey &
Julia Simon-Kerr, A Simple Theory of Complex Valuation, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1175 (2015).
230 See, e.g., Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S.
414, 442 n.20 (1968) (reversing the lower court because it had not looked to future earnings in an absolute
priority valuation).
231 Cases favoring a clearly erroneous standard include: Alberts v. HCA, Inc., 496 B.R. 1, 14 n.6 (D.D.C.
2013); Estate of Godley v. Comm’r, 286 F.3d 210, 212 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding valuation methodology is “part
of the larger factual question of valuation” and this issue is reviewed for clear error); Gross v. Comm’r, 272
F.3d 333, 343 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The choice of the appropriate valuation methodology for a particular stock is,
in itself, a question of fact.”) (citations omitted); Sammons v. Comm’r, 838 F.2d 330, 334 (9th Cir. 1988)
(determining whether the Tax Court appropriately selected cost method of valuing art collection is question of
fact reviewed for clear error). Cases favoring a de novo standard include: McGarey v. Midfirst Bank (In re
McGarey), 529 B.R. 277, 282 (D. Ariz. 2015); Nat’l Rural Utils. Coop. Fin. Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power
Ass’n, 111 B.R. 752, 767 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990) (“The bankruptcy court’s selection and application of
valuation methodology is primarily a legal matter.”).
232 496 B.R. at 13.
229
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found in the market are shown to be sufficiently reflective of the risks inherent
in the plan of reorganization, then market rates may influence the increase to
the risk-free rate used in Till.233 Judge Drain recognized this point: “[M]arketbased evidence should not be considered, except, arguably and, if so
secondarily, when setting a proper risk premium in the formula approach taken
by Till and Valenti.”234
This point is underscored by the statutory analysis employed in Till. In
footnote 14, the Supreme Court provided a very short and cryptic dicta when
interpreting what the appropriate discount rate might be: “[I]t might make
sense to ask what rate an efficient market would produce.”235
This approach makes prosecuting and proving cramdown cases perilous for
lawyers. It means that value, and the discount rate used to obtain value, are
factual matters subject to a deferential standard of review. But given the
history of the “fair and equitable” rule, the goal of this inquiry is not to reach a
“conclusion [that] correspond[s] to the valuation that the relevant community
believes to be accurate”236 Rather, the goal is to make
a prediction as to what will occur in the future, an estimate, as
distinguished from mathematical certitude. . . . But that estimate must
be based on an informed judgment which embraces all facts relevant
to future earning capacity and hence to present worth, including, of
course, the nature and condition of the properties, the past earnings
record, and all circumstances which indicate whether or not that
record is a reliable criterion of future performance.237

As the Third Circuit noted:
[T]he market can be expected irrationally to undervalue the securities
of a once-distressed company emerging from a lengthy
reorganization. . . . That argument has considerable force when the
securities in issue represent equity in, or long term interest bearing
obligations of, a reorganized debtor. . . . In such cases, the market
value of the security will depend upon the investing public’s
233 Casey & Simon-Kerr, supra note 229, at 1206 (“[W]hat judges are required and competent to do, in
addition to excluding unqualified experts, is to question the assumptions that the experts make, to insist that
experts persuade them that theirs is the best methodology, to be meticulous in questioning the pieces that make
up that methodology, and to enforce the burden of proof.”).
234 Momentive, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 WL 4436335, at *26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 531 B.R. 321
(S.D.N.Y. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-1771 (2d Cir. filed June 1, 2015) (emphasis added).
235 Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 476 n.14 (2004).
236 Casey & Simon-Kerr, supra note 229, at 1206.
237 Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 526 (1941).
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perception of the future prospects of the enterprise. That perception
may well be unduly distorted by the recently concluded
reorganization and the prospect of lean years for the enterprise in the
immediate future. Use of a substitute “reorganization value” may
under the circumstances be the only fair means of determining the
value of the securities distributed.238

This policy of excising components of bankruptcy “taint” raises the stakes
in “getting it right” at confirmation, and underscores the need for persuasive
presentation of valuation evidence. Tied up in this analysis are two
propositions: (1) “value” in § 1129(b)(2) can encompass a formula-based
approach; and (2) determining the components of the formula need not turn a
blind eye to market evidence to the extent that such evidence bears on the
formula’s risk factors (or to the extent that some other method of valuation
exists that does not penalize the debtor for its status and focuses on future cash
flow). Given the wide scope of “relevance” under the Federal Rules of
Evidence,239 this policy opens a wide door for market-based evidence. What it
does not do, however, is change the formula into which such evidence is
inserted.
CONCLUSION
I began with the assertion that valuation in reorganization is messy. This
untidiness is exemplified by the process of selecting an appropriate discount
rate to use to value a stream of payments under a plan of reorganization, and
by the lack of indisputably accurate valuations. There is a natural tendency to
factor in that the debtor, as the obligor on such payments, has already broken
all its previous promises.
To counteract this gloomy perspective, reorganization doctrine and policy
have always indicated that intrinsic value, not market-based prices, should
have primacy in determining the value of a debtor or reorganization debt. But
the inputs necessary to produce intrinsic value are flexible; a bankruptcy court
can admit any evidence that tends to make a valuation opinion more or less
likely. Thus, valuation can and usually is shown by whatever forward-looking
relevant evidence can be adduced.
238 In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 596 F.2d 1102, 1115–16 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing In re Mo. Pac. R.R., 39 F.
Supp. 436, 446 (E.D. Mo. 1941)). Accord Walter J. Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate
Reorganization, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 565, 566–69 (1950)).
239 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, a fact is relevant if it is of consequence, and if it has “any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable.” FED. R. EVID. 401 (emphasis added).
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There are, of course, limitations. Through a series of cases decided soon
after the adoption of the current “fair and equitable” standard, the Supreme
Court indicated a broad preference for evidence of future earning capacity over
past values, for “fair equivalents” of value rather than mathematically precise
determinations. This process is designed to produce property the value of
which is the “fair equivalent” of the debt discharged in the reorganization, an
exhortation to not pay too little to creditors.
At the same time, courts have indicated that the valuation evidence adduced
needs to be stripped of components related to the taint of past failures;
valuations are to be based upon reasonable future prospects, not on past or
perceived present failures. This protects junior creditors and is an embodiment
of the “don’t pay too much” concept.
Against this background, Till’s formula-based approach provides a rough
and ready “fair equivalent” of value as Consolidated Rock and its progeny
require. The use of the Till formula is devoid of reliance on factors
incorporating the debtor’s past errors and does not treat the debtor as riskier
just because of its bankruptcy filing.
Market-based rates, in contrast, inevitably incorporate elements that history
and doctrine have tried to scrub from the reorganization process. They also
imbue their results with far more precision than the facts in most
reorganizations can justify, or the policy behind reorganization can tolerate.
Until valuation practice produces better methodologies that fit within the
boundaries of the “fair and equitable” standard set early on by the Supreme
Court, or until Congress changes confirmation standards, Till’s formula-based
discount rates will be unassailable in chapter 11.

